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ABSTRACT
This dissertation applies stochastic control theory to two problems: i) portfolio choice
of hedge fund managers compensated by performance fees, and ii) consumption and
investment in incomplete markets.
Part I. Optimal portfolios are derived in closed form for a fund manager, who is
paid performance fees with a high-water mark provision, and invests both the fund's
assets and private wealth in separate and potentially correlated, constant investment
opportunities. The manager's goal is to maximize expected utility from private wealth
in the long run, with constant relative risk aversion.
At the optimum, the private portfolio depends only on the private investment
opportunity, and the fund's portfolio only on fund's opportunity. The manager in-
vests earned fees in the safe asset, allocating remaining private wealth in a constant-
proportion portfolio with his own risk aversion. The fund is managed as a constant-
proportion portfolio with risk aversion shifted towards one. The optimal welfare is
the maximum between the optimal welfare of each investment opportunity alone.
Part II. An agent maximizes isoelastic utility from consumption with innite
horizon in an incomplete market, in which state variables are driven by diusion-
s. First, a general verication theorem is provided, which links the solution of the
iv
Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation to the optimal consumption and investment poli-
cies. To tackle the analytical intractability of such problems, approximate policies are
proposed, which admit an upper bound, in closed-form for their utility loss. These
policies are optimal for the same agent in an articial and complete market, in which
the safe rate and the state variable follow dierent dynamics, but excess returns
remain the same. The approximate policies have closed form solutions in common
models, and become optimal if the market is complete, or utility is logarithmic.
v
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Consumption and investment in continuous time models is central to Mathematical
Finance. The question is how investors in nancial markets allocate wealth between
consumption and investment across dierent assets, in order to maximize utility from
wealth and/or consumption.
Markowitz (1952) solves this problem in a static setting: investors select portfolios
of risky and risk-free assets in order to minimize the variance of the portfolio for every
level of expected return. The results indicate that diversication is benecial, because
for the same expected returns, it reduces the variance of portfolios of correlated assets.
Merton (1969, 1971) studies this problem in a continuous-time, dynamic setting:
investors, in the face of risky assets moving like geometric Brownian Motions, maxi-
mize power utility from terminal wealth or consumption. The answer to this problem
both describes agents' optimal policies in a nancial market, and solves the corre-
sponding pricing problem. Indeed, as duality theory shows, the pricing kernel is
proportional to the marginal utility at optimal payos (in Merton's case, terminal
wealth or consumption). Following is a brief summary of Merton's results, which are
the archetype for the problems discussed in this dissertation.
21.1 Merton's Model
Consider a nancial market with a risk-free asset S0 and n risky assets S = (S1; : : : ; Sn),
dS0t
S0t
=rdt; (1.1.1)
dSit
Sit
=rdt+ dRit; 1  i  n; (1.1.2)
dRit =idt+
nX
j=1
ijdW
j
t ; 1  i  n; (1.1.3)
where r, i, ij are constants, for all 1  i  n and 1  j  n.  = 0 is positive
denite and W = (W1;    ;Wn) is an n-dimentional multivariate Brownian Motion.
An agent allocates wealth among these assets according to a portfolio  2 Rn,
where it represents the proportion of wealth invested in S
i at time t, and the pro-
portion invested in the safe asset is 1 Pni=1 it. In addition, the agent consumes at
a continuous rate ct  0. Then, with initial wealth X0 = x, the corresponding wealth
process X;ct follows:
dXt = rX
;c
t dt+ 
0 (dt+ dWt)X
;c
t   ctdt: (1.1.4)
From a setA = f(; c)jX;ct  0 for all 0  t  Tg, the agent chooses optimally
the pair (; c), in order to maximize power utility from terminal wealth at a future
date T ,
max
(;c)2A
E

X1 T
1  

; (1.1.5)
or from consumption until T ,
max
(;c)2A
E
Z T
0
e t
c1 t
1   dt

; (1.1.6)
3where  is the agent's relative risk aversion and  is the subjective time-preference
parameter.
For objective (1.1.5), since only the terminal wealth matters, the optimal con-
sumption is 0, so that every dollar is saved until T , and the optimal portfolio is
^t =
 1

: (1.1.7)
For objective (1.1.6), the optimal policies are
^t =
 1

; (1.1.8)
c^t =
1

 +
   1


r +
0 1
2

: (1.1.9)
under the well-posedness condition: 1

 +  1


r + 
0 1
2

> 0.
This result indicates that to maximize utility from either terminal wealth or con-
sumption, the optimal portfolio is the same constant in (1.1.7) and (1.1.8), which is
called the Merton portfolio. This portfolio, with consumption ct = 0 for all t  0,
also maximizes the exponential growth rate of the utility from terminal wealth:
max
(;c)2A
1
T
lnE
h
(X;cT )
1 
i 1
1 
= r +
0 1
2
: (1.1.10)
The optimal consumption in (1.1.9) is a convex combination of the subjective time-
preference parameter  and the maximal exponential growth rate of utility in (1.1.10).
Merton's model is popular for its tractability, and allowing to understand the
eects of risk aversion, investment opportunity and subjective time preference on a-
gents' optimal choice of consumption and portfolio. But its assumptions of i) agents'
direct investment in risky assets, and ii) constant investment opportunities, are ideal-
4izations that can not fully describe practices in nancial markets. Following are two
stylized facts that deviate from Merton's model.
1.2 Financial Intermediaries
With nancial intermediaries, which have been growing fast in the last several years,
investors do not have to trade directly in exchanges and construct portfolios of every
single asset, which oers many interesting research topics, because what investors
can control is only the selection among nancial intermediaries with a variety of in-
vestment styles and managerial contracts, and it is not clear what choices are best
for investors' interest. For example, the hedge fund industry, which, as pointed out
in Aragon and Nanda (2012), has assets worth more than one trillion U.S. dollars
under management in 2009, compensates hedge fund managers by performance fees,
provided by funds' prot. Since managers want to maximize utility from their person-
al wealth (including earned fees), not the fund's value, this compensation structure
raises the question of moral hazard: Are fund managers encouraged to manage hedge
funds in a way that is in the best interests of clients, or themselves?
When deciding which fund to invest in, besides the fund's investment styles, one
key aspect of investors' decision is whether the fund's compensation scheme can pre-
vent managers from sacricing shareholders' interests for more fees? From market
regulators' view point, it is also of importance what performance fee schedules can
best align the manager's and investors' interests. The rst step to answer investors'
and regulators' questions is to know how managers behave in the face of dierent com-
pensation schemes. Chapter 2 studies the eects of a performance fee schedule that
is commonly used in practice { the high-water mark performance fees, and answers
the following questions: i) will managers' portfolio choice for the fund's investment
5change with private investment opportunities for performance fees, compared to the
case in which fees are restricted to the safe asset? ii) will managers hedge against the
risk in the fund investment by private investment of fees? iii) Can managers' com-
pound the return in the private investment to the return in the fund investment, as
Merton investors do with two risky assets? iv) Will private investment of fees induce
managers' preference to higher rate of performance fees?
1.3 Stochastic Investment Opportunities and Incomplete Mar-
kets
Merton's setting assumes that the risk-free rate, expected excess returns and volatil-
ities of risky assets are all constants, in contrast to many empirical studies, which
indicate that investment opportunities change over time. Campbell and Shiller (1989)
and Fama and French (1989) study the predictability of stock returns; Results in Fama
and Bliss (1987) and Cochrane and Piazessi (2005) show that bond returns are also
predictable; Ball and Torous (2000) nd that correlations across international stock
markets are stochastic. Furthermore, it is always impossible to hedge all risks that
aect these changing market parameters, solely by holding a portfolio of risky assets
traded in the nancial market, which makes the market incomplete. Consumption
and investment problems with stochastic investment opportunities and incomplete
markets are more complex, because besides making decisions based on the current
state of economy, investors have to anticipate changes in the distribution of asset
returns in the future and try to hedge as much as possible this additional risk. Chap-
ter 3 investigates this issue in a general framework of incomplete markets, in which
all market parameters are functions of stochastic state variables. In particular, i)
what are the eects of state variables on the optimal consumption and portfolios? ii)
6What are the eects of the market's incompleteness on the optimal consumption and
portfolios?
Both Chapter 2 and 3 are based on papers I co-authored with Poalo Guasoni.
Chapter 2
Optimal Portfolio with High-Water Mark
Performance Fees
2.1 Introduction
A line of research that emerges in recent years focuses on the eects of convex compen-
sation schemes, such as the high-water mark provision, on portfolio choice of hedge
fund managers. Performance fees are a hedge fund manager's main source of income,
and are typically 20% of a fund's prot after reaching a new historical maximum (also
called the high-water mark), with the high-water mark provision. This compensation
scheme requires that previous losses must be recovered before more fees are paid. As
an illustration, Figure 2.1 shows a fund's balance which follows a geometric Brownian
Motion, with the corresponding high-water mark and accumulative performance fees.
A manager's large exposure to fund's performance is a powerful incentive to deliver
superior returns, but it is also a potential source of moral hazard, as the manager
may use private wealth to hedge such exposure, and thus induces more risk taking in
the fund than is in investors' interest. From a regulator's viewpoint, understanding
82 4 6 8
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Figure 2.1: One path of the fund balance following a geometric Brownian Motion
(vertical axis), with drift 0:08 and volatility 0:16, with the corresponding high-water
mark (dashed line) and cumulative performance fees (dotted line), which are 25% of
the increase in the running maximum, against time (horizontal axis).
managers' behavior in the face of performance fees helps design compensation schemes
and regulation that eciently align investors' and managers' interests.
Carpenter (2000) considers a risk averse manager compensated by a call option
on the fund at a nite horizon, and nds that he takes excessive risk if the option is
deeply out of the money. In Panageas and Westereld (2009), a risk neutral manager
maximizes discounted fees with a long horizon, and optimally takes moderate risk
because higher risk in the fund may generate fees in a short term, but reduces the
long run growth rate of the fund. The risk averse manager with power utility in
Guasoni and Ob loj (2012) behaves like a Merton investor with a dierent relative risk
aversion. All these models acknowledge that reinvestment of fees makes hedging the
exposure to the fund's risk possible, and is a source of potential moral hazard, but
avoid it rather than modeling it, by assuming that private wealth, including earned
fees, are invested at the risk-free rate1. As a result, the literature is eectively silent
1As an exception, Aragon and Qian (2010) restrict earned fees to reinvestment in the fund, which
also excludes hedging attempts.
9on the interplay between a manager's personal and professional investments.
This chapter begins to ll this gap. Section 2.2.1 sets up a model with two invest-
ment opportunities that are constant over time, separate and potentially correlated,
one accessible to the fund, the other accessible to the manager's private account. To
make the model tractable, and consistently with the literature, we consider a fund
manager with constant relative risk aversion and a long horizon, who maximizes u-
tility from private wealth. The assumption of a long horizon means, in particular,
that the model's conclusions are driven by a stationary risk-return tradeo, not by
the short-term incentives created by nite horizons. Section 2.2.2 discusses the case
when the Sharpe ratio of the private investment is zero, and gives an alternative
interpretation of results in Guasoni and Ob loj (2012).
The main results and their implications are summarized in Section 2.3. We nd the
manager's optimal investment policies explicitly. For the fund, the optimal portfolio
entails a constant risky proportion, which corresponds to the eective risk aversion
identied by Guasoni and Ob loj (2012) in the absence of private investments. The
optimal policy for private wealth is more complex. The manager leaves earned fees in
the safe asset, investing remaining wealth according to an optimal constant-proportion
portfolio, which corresponds to the manager's own relative risk aversion. The result
of these policies combined is that the manager obtains the maximum welfare between
the fund and private wealth.
The signicance of this result is threefold. First, the model predicts that the
fund composition does not aect the manager's private investments, and that such
investments also do not aect the fund composition { portfolio separation holds. In
particular, even if investment opportunities are highly correlated, the manager does
not attempt to hedge exposure to the fund's risk with a position in the private account.
The intuition is that, for a long horizon, the benets from hedging are surpassed by
10
the costs of holding a short position in an asset with positive return.
Second, the manager does not rebalance all private wealth. Indeed, the optimal
policy is to leave earned fees in the safe asset, and to rebalance only excess wealth.
This policy eectively replicates a pocket of private wealth that grows like the high-
water mark of the fund, while leaving the other pocket to grow at the optimal rate for
private investments. Over time, the pocket with the larger growth rate will dominate
the private portfolio, delivering the maximum welfare of the two strategies. In contrast
to usual portfolio allocation with multiple assets, private investments can outperform
the fund, but cannot compound its return, regardless of correlation.
Third, since the manager's welfare is the maximum between the fund's and the
private wealth's, our policy is always optimal, but never unique. Indeed, if the fund
delivers the optimal welfare, it does not matter how the manager invests private
capital in excess of earned fees. By contrast, if private investments deliver optimal
welfare, it does not matter how earned fees or even the fund are invested. While lack
of uniqueness is an extreme eect of the long-horizon approximation, it highlights
that in this model either the fund, or private investments, become the main focus of
the manager, without interactions. Further, the model yields the conditions under
which the manager focuses on the fund rather than private wealth.
In summary, we nd that high-water marks in performance fees reduce (in the
long run, eliminate) a manager's incentive to use private investments either to hedge
fund exposure, or to augment the fund's returns. This conclusion remains valid if the
manager has private access to the fund's investment opportunities, a situation that
is nested in our model if correlation between investment opportunities is perfect.
The results can inform the decisions of investors and regulators alike. For in-
vestors, the main message is that moral hazard is likely to be higher for managers
who face shorter horizons, either because the holding period of their average investor
11
is shorter, or because redemptions are allowed more frequently. Also, arrangements
that increase a manager's horizon, such as longer lock-up periods, reduce the potential
for moral-hazard, as do high-water mark provisions. These observations are broad-
ly consistent with those of Aragon and Qian (2010), which nd that these contract
features help alleviate asymmetric-information issues for hedge funds.
From a regulatory viewpoint, our results suggest that restrictions on managers'
private investments may be redundant, if funds' contracts lead managers to act with
a long horizon perspective, because high-water marks, combined with long horizons,
reduce managers' incentives to privately trade against investors' interests.
Section 2.4 oers a heuristic derivation of the main result, using informal argu-
ments of stochastic control in the case of logarithmic utility case, and Section 2.5
contains the formal verication of the main theorem.
2.2 Model
2.2.1 Investment Opportunities and Preferences
A fund manager aims at maximizing utility from private wealth at a long horizon. (For
brevity, henceforth `private wealth' is simply `wealth', unless ambiguity arises.) To
achieve this goal, the manager has two tools: allocating the fund's assets X between
a safe asset and a risky asset SX , and allocating wealth F , including performance
fees earned from the fund, between the safe asset and another risky asset SF . The
interpretation is that the fund has access to investment opportunities that, because
of scale, regulation, or technology, are restricted to institutional investors. Examples
of such investments are institutional funds, restricted shares, such as Rule 144a se-
curities, or high-frequency trading strategies. By contrast, the manager's wealth is
invested in securities available to individual investors.
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The fund's (SX) and private (SF ) risky assets follow two correlated geometric
Brownian Motions, with expected returns, volatilities and the Sharpe ratio X ; X ,
X = 
X
X
and F ; F , F = 
F
F
respectively. Formally, consider a ltered probability
space (
;F ; (F)t0; P ) equipped with the Brownian Motions (WXt )t0 and (W Ft )t0,
with correlation  (i.e., hWX ;W F it = t), and dene the risky assets as
dSXt
SXt
=Xdt+ XdWXt ; (2.2.1)
dSFt
SFt
=Fdt+ FdW Ft : (2.2.2)
The manager chooses the proportion of the fund X to invest in the asset SX , and
the proportion of wealth F to invest in the asset SF . The strategies X and F
are square-integrable processes, adapted to Ft, dened as the augmentation of the
ltration generated by WX and W F .
The high-water mark Xt is the running maximum X

t = max
0st
Xs of the net value
of the fund. To ease notation, we assume a zero safe rate.2 Then, the net fund
return equals the gross return on the amount invested X
X
t 
X
t , minus performance
fees, which are a fraction of the increase in the high-water mark. Thus,
dX
X
t = X
X
t 
X
t
 
Xdt+ XdWXt
  
1  dX
X
t : (2.2.3)
In this SDE, the last term reects the fact that each dollar of gross prot is split
into  as performance fees, plus 1    as net return, whence performance fees are
=(1  ) times the net return.
Similarly, the return on the manager's wealth equals the return on the risky wealth
2Guasoni and Ob loj (2012) consider a constant safe rate, and nd that its value does not aect
the optimal fund's policy, suggesting that the assumption of a zero safe rate is inconsequential.
13
F 
X ;F
t 
F
t , plus the fees earned from the fund, i.e.
dF 
X ;F
t = F
X ;F
t 
F
t
 
Fdt+ FdW Ft

+

1  dX
X
t : (2.2.4)
Note, in particular, that while the fund evolution depends only on its policy X , the
evolution of wealth F 
X ;F
t depends both on 
F and on X , as the latter drives earned
fees.
The fund manager chooses ^Xt and ^
F
t as to maximize expected utility from fees
in the long run, that is, the equivalent safe rate (ESR) of wealth (cf. Grossman and
Zhou (1993); Dumas and Luciano (1991); Cvitanic and Karatzas (1995)):
ESR(
X ; F ) =
8>><>>:
lim
T!1
1
T
lnE

F 
X ;F
T
1  11 
; 0 <  6= 1;
lim
T!1
1
T
E
h
lnF 
X ;F
T
i
;  = 1:
(2.2.5)
This equivalent safe rate measures the manager's welfare, and has the dimension of
an interest rate. It corresponds to the hypothetical safe rate which would make the
manager indierent between (i) actively managing fund and wealth, and (ii) retiring
from the fund, investing all wealth at this riskless rate.
2.2.2 The Case of F = 0
When F = 0, the private investment opportunity is not attractive at all, and all
wealth should be invested the safe asset, which is conrmed in Theorem 2.1 below.
Thus, the case of F = 0 is eectively equivalent to the model where wealth is
restricted to the safe asset and the fund's optimal portfolio should be the same.
The latter model is studied in Guasoni and Ob loj (2012), and the following gives an
alternative interpretation of the model and results in that paper.
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Since the risk free rate is 0, from (2.5.4) below, for any X ,
F 
X ;0
t =

1  

X
X
t  X0

=

1  X0

e(1 )R
X
t   1

; (2.2.6)
where RX is dened in (2.5.1) below. The fund manager invests the fund optimally,
in order to maximize the ESR of wealth:
lim sup
T!1
1
T
lnE

F 
X ;0
T
1  11 
= lim sup
T!1
1
T
lnE

X1 0

e(1 )R
X
T   1
1  11 
(2.2.7)
= lim sup
T!1
1
T
lnE
h
e(1 )(1 )R
X
T
i 1
1 
= (1  ) lim sup
T!1
1
T
lnE
h
e(1 
)RXT
i 1
1 
(2.2.8)
where  =  + (1  ).
Note that eR
X
T is the running maximum of wealth with X invested in SX . Thus,
the model in which performance fees are restricted in the safe asset and managers
maximize ESR of wealth can be alternatively interpreted as: for an agent with relative
risk aversion , who faces constant investment opportunities, what is the optimal
investment strategy that maximizes (1 ) of the ESR of wealth's running maximum?
Here the objective is not the terminal wealth, but its running maximum. Hence this
is like a path dependent derivative, where the buyer has certain degrees of freedom,
not to choose the time to exercise optimally, as for American type options, but to
choose the investment strategy optimally.
The results in Guasoni and Ob loj (2012) imply that the optimal strategy is ^X =
X
(X)2
and the optimal welfare is
(1 )(X)2
2 , which is the Merton portfolio and (1 
) of the optimal welfare, respectively, for investors with relative risk aversion 
and constant investment opportunity X . The authors' interpretation is that high-
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water mark performance fee schedules shift the manager's risk aversion, and the
manager acts like a Merton investor for the fund investment. From the above new
interpretation of the model, this result also shows that in the long run, maximizing
utility from running maximum of wealth is equivalent to maximizing utility from
terminal wealth.
2.3 Solutions and Discussions
2.3.1 Main Theorem
The main result below identies the manager's optimal policies, and the corresponding
welfare. It is proved in the case of logarithmic risk aversion or lower (  1), hence
it allows to understand the risk-neutral limit  # 0.
Theorem 2.1. Let  2 (0; 1], and set  =  + (1  ). The investment policies
^Xt =
X
 (X)2
; (2.3.1)
^Ft =
 
1  
1  
X ^
X
t  X0
Ft
!
F
 (F )2
; (2.3.2)
attain the manager's maximum equivalent safe rate of wealth, which equals to
ESR(^
X ; ^F ) = max
  
X
2
2( + 
1 )
;
 
F
2
2
!
: (2.3.3)
The optimal fund policy in (2.3.1) shows that the manager invests in the constant-
proportion portfolio with relative risk aversion  between one and the manager's own
relative risk aversion . This policy, even with F 6= 0, coincides with the one obtained
by Guasoni and Ob loj (2012) in the absence of private investment opportunities, which
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corresponds in our model to F = 0. In this case, the private risky opportunity has
zero return, hence it is never used.
The private policy in (2.3.2) is best understood in terms of the total risky and
safe positions, which amount respectively to
F^t^
F
t =

F^t   
1  

X^t  X0
 F
 (F )2
; (2.3.4)
F^t(1  ^Ft ) =

F^t   
1  

X^t  X0

1  
F
 (F )2

+

1  

X^t  X0

:
(2.3.5)
These formulas show that the manager divides wealth into earned fees 
1 

X^t  X0

,
which are set aside in the safe asset, and the rest, which is invested in the constant-
proportion portfolio with the manager's own relative risk aversion . The manager's
welfare in (2.3.3) equals the maximum between the welfare of fees and the welfare of
private investments.
2.3.2 Portfolio Separation
A salient feature of this result is that the fund policy is independent of private posi-
tions, and vice versa. In other words, ^X does not depend on F ; F , and ^F does not
depend on X ; X . Further, neither ^X nor ^F depend on the correlation coecient
 between investment opportunities. We call this property portfolio separation.
Portfolio separation entails that a manager with long horizon has no incentive to
hedge the exposure of future performance fees to the fund's investments with private
risky assets, regardless of their correlation. In fact, hedging does not take place even
in the limit case X = F ; X = F and  = 1, which corresponds to a manager who
has unfettered access to the fund with private capital, and hence faces a dynamically
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complete market.
The biggest concern about high-water mark performance fees combined with fees'
private investment opportunities is that when the fund and private investment oppor-
tunities are highly correlated, managers may, like a Merton investor, short on private
investments and take a larger risk in the fund investment, which may be against
clients' interests. To understand why such hedging is ineective, consider a manager
whose fund trades well below its high-water mark, as it is the case for the most of
the time. In this case, there is nothing to hedge against the short position in private
investments, because the high-water mark (and hence future income) is insensitive to
small variations in the fund value, and therefore reduces the growth of wealth in the
long run.
Mathematically, though the two investment opportunities are correlated, the high-
water mark is increasing, hence of bounded variation, and hence has zero local co-
variance with the private investment. Since high-water mark performance fees are
the manager's source of income and thus the only thing he cares about from the fund
side, correlation does not matter.
Conversely, portfolio separation implies that the manager has no incentive to take
more or less risk in the fund, in view of private investment opportunities outside the
fund. A priori, it may seem plausible that a manager takes more risk in the fund
if outside opportunities are attractive, because more risk is likely to lead to earlier
performance fees, which could then be invested in outside opportunities. However,
this tactic can only generate a one-time transfer of wealth, but not a lasting increase
in the growth rate of the manager's wealth, hence it is long-run irrelevant.
In summary, the message of portfolio separation is largely positive: if horizons are
long, then moral hazard concerns are limited, because high-water marks essentially
defeat any hedging incentives between the fund and wealth. Yet, portfolio separation
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has a downside { attention separation.
2.3.3 Attention Separation
As a consequence of portfolio separation, the manager's welfare in (2.3.3) is the maxi-
mum between the welfare from performance fees, and the welfare of remaining wealth.
Thus, while the joint policy in (2.3.1) and (2.3.2) is optimal in all cases, it is never
unique. Indeed, if the manager's welfare in (2.3.3) is due to the fund (i.e. performance
fees), then private investment opportunities becomes irrelevant, and can be replaced,
for example, with the policy F = 0. Vice versa, if remaining wealth drives welfare,
then the fund policy is irrelevant, and utter negligence (X = 0) will deliver the same
result.
This rather extreme implication is clearly driven by the assumption of a long-
horizon, which focuses on the risk-adjusted long-term growth rate, neglecting all
other welfare eects. Still, it makes it clear that a manager's commitment to the
fund will easily wane, unless its investments are superior to outside opportunities.
The manager's attention inevitably shifts to either the fund, or wealth, whichever is
more protable.
Indeed, equation (2.3.3) shows that the manager focuses on the fund if and only if
the fund's Sharpe ratio X exceeds the private Sharpe ratio F by a multiple, which
depends on the fund's fees and on the manager's risk aversion:
X
F


1 +

(1  )
 1
2
: (2.3.6)
For example, in the case of a logarithmic manager ( = 1), and performance fees of
20%, the manager focuses on the fund, provided that its Sharpe ratio is 11.8% higher
than private investments. Such a condition is likely to hold in practice: Getmansky,
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Lo and Makarov (2004) nd high Sharpe ratios in the hedge fund industry, even after
controlling for return smoothing and illiquidity.
The right-hand side in (2.3.6), which represents the manager's attention threshold,
grows as risk aversion declines. The explanation is as follows: as risk aversion declines
to zero, the eective risk aversion  = + (1 ) induced by the high-water mark
converges to , which entails nite leverage in the fund. On the other hand, the
private portfolio is driven by the true risk aversion , which declines to zero, leading to
increasingly high leverage. Because leverage can arbitrarily magnify expected returns,
for suciently low risk aversion the private portfolio is always more attractive.
Overall, attention separation brings both some bad news, as the manager may
grossly neglect a fund if it does not oer suciently attractive returns, and some
good news, since the conditions for attention to the fund seem mild, and a manager
with very low risk aversion is likely to leverage wealth rather than the fund.
2.3.4 Growth and Fees
A puzzling feature of extant models of performance fees is that a manager prefers
lower performance fees, i.e. welfare is decreasing in . The explanation of this nding,
common to the models of Panageas and Westereld (2009) with risk-neutrality, and
of Guasoni and Ob loj (2012) with risk aversion, is that higher fees today reduce the
growth rate of the fund, leading to lower fees tomorrow. Both models assume that
fees are invested at the safe rate in the manager's account, and raise the question of
whether reinvestment can induce preference for higher fees.
Equation (2.3.3) oers a qualied negative answer. If private risky investments are
available, there will be a threshold , below which the manager prefers lower fees, as
in the absence of private investments, and above which the manager is indierent to
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changes in fees, because the fund becomes irrelevant, as welfare is entirely driven by
wealth. This threshold is in fact the value of alpha for which (2.3.6) holds as equality.
This result is essentially a consequence of portfolio separation. Because the man-
ager is unable to compound fund growth with wealth growth, either private invest-
ments make fees negligible, or are negligible themselves. Overall, the model shows
that the reinvestment value of fees is not sucient to obtain a manager's preference
for higher payout rates, which in turn is likely to involve intertemporal preference for
consumption, or fund ows.
2.4 Heuristic Solution
This section derives a candidate optimal solution with heuristic stochastic control
arguments. For brevity, this heuristic argument is presented only for the case of
logarithmic utility, while the rigorous proof for all cases 0 <   1 is in the next
section.
To ease notation, in the argument below we drop the superscripts X and F from
Xt and Ft. Denoting by Zt = X

t  X0, the manager's value function is
V (t; x; f; z) = sup
X ;F
Et [lnFT jXt = x; Ft = f; Zt = z] : (2.4.1)
By I^to's formula,
dV (t; x; f; z)
=

Vt + x
XXt Vx + f
FFt Vf +
(XxXt )
2
2 Vxx +
(F fFt )
2
2 Vff + 
XFxfXt 
F
t Vxf

dt
+ XxXt VxdW
X
t + 
F fFt VfdW
F
t +

Vz +

1  (Vf   Vx)

dXt :
Thus, the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation for V (t; x; f; z) is, for 0 < x <
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z +X0,
 Vt = sup
X ;F
 
xXXt Vx + f
FFt Vf +
 
XxXt
2
2
Vxx +
 
F fFt
2
2
Vff + 
XFxfXt 
F
t Vxf
!
;
with the boundary condition:
Vz +

1  (Vf   Vx) = 0 when x = z +X0:
By the usual scaling property of logarithmic utility, and in the long-horizon limit,
we can rewrite the value function as V (t; x; f; z) =  t+ln z+v(; ), where  = ln x
z
and  = ln f
z
, and the HJB equation becomes
 = sup
X ;F
 
XXt v + 
FFt v +
 
XXt
2
2
(v   v) +
 
FFt
2
2
(v   v) + XFXt Ft v
!
;
for 0 < x < z +X0, while the boundary condition reduces to
(1  )  v ( exp( ) + (1  )) + v ( exp( )  (1  )) = 0;
when x = z +X0.
Since the manager's aim is to maximize the ESR of wealth and X becomes large
at optimum in the long run, the initial fund's value X0 should not matter in this
optimization problem. Thus, Xt  Zt = Xt  X0, and we can approximate the HJB
equation and the boundary condition with
 = sup
X ;F
 
XXt v + 
FFt v +
 
XXt
2
2
(v   v) +
 
FFt
2
2
(v   v) + XFXt Ft v
!
;
(2.4.2)
when  1 <  < 0, and
(1  )  v + v ( exp( )  (1  )) = 0; (2.4.3)
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when  = 0.
The rst order conditions for X and F in (2.4.2) are
Xt =  
FXv(v   v)  XFvv
(X)2 F
 
(v   v)(v   v)  2v2
 ; (2.4.4)
Ft =  
XFv(v   v)  FXvv
X (F )2
 
(v   v)(v   v)  2v2
 : (2.4.5)
Plugging (2.4.4) and (2.4.5) in (2.4.2) yields: when  1 <  < 0,
  =
 
XF
2
v2 (v   v)  2XFFXvvv +
 
XF
2
v2(v   v)
2 (XF )2
 
(v   v)(v   v)  2v2
 = 0:
(2.4.6)
Since v also solves (2.4.3), v v ( exp( )  (1  )) is a constant for any  2 R
when  = 0. Thus, we guess the solution to (2.4.3) as v(; ) =  + b ln j   (1  
) exp()j, where , b and  are three parameters to be found. Plugging this guess into
(2.4.3) gives b = 1 . Finally, plugging v(t; ; ) = +(1 ) ln j  (1 ) exp()j
into (2.4.4), (2.4.5) and (2.4.6) yields:
^Xt =
X
(X)2
; (2.4.7)
^Ft =

1  z
(1  )f

F
(F )2
; (2.4.8)
() =

2
 
X
2
+

1  
1  

1
2
 
F
2
: (2.4.9)
Notice that ^Xt and ^
F
t do not depend on  and taking  to be 0 when
(F )
2
2

(1 )(X)2
2
and 1  when (
F )
2
2
<
(1 )(X)2
2
yields (2.3.3). (2.4.7) and (2.4.8) help us
to conjecture the optimal policies for the fund and private investments: the manager
puts performance fees, which are z
(1 )f of wealth in the safe asset, and invests the
rest in the Merton portfolio. For the fund, the same strategy as in Guasoni and Ob loj
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(2012) is adopted, as to ensure the maximum ESR from performance fees.
2.5 Verication
We now show that the policies (2.3.1) and (2.3.2) are optimal, and lead to the maxi-
mum ESR from wealth in (2.3.3).
2.5.1 The Fund Value and The Fees
We start by dening the following processes, which represent cumulative log returns,
before fees, on the fund and wealth respectively,
RXt =
Z t
0

XXs  
1
2
 
XXs
2
ds+ XXs dW
X
s

; (2.5.1)
RFt =
Z t
0

FFs  
1
2
 
FFs
2
ds+ FFs dW
F
s

; (2.5.2)
RXt;T = R
X
T  RXt ;
RFt;T = R
F
T  RFt :
RX and RF depend on X and F , respectively, and should be denoted as RX;
X
and
RF;
F
. We drop these superscripts for ease of notation, unless it causes ambiguity.
SDEs (2.2.3), (2.2.4), Proposition 7 and Lemma 8 in Guasoni and Ob loj (2012)
imply that
Xt = X0e
RXt  (RX)

t ; (2.5.3)
Xt = X0e
(1 )(RX)
t ; (2.5.4)
Ft = F0e
RFt +

1  
Z t
0
eR
F
s;tdXs : (2.5.5)
24
2.5.2 Proof of Theorem 2.1
The discussion begins with two simple lemmas that are used often in the proof of the
main theorem.
Lemma 2.2. Let Xt and Yt be two continuous processes, and dene X

t = max
0st
Xs
and Yt = min
0st
Ys. Then X

t + Yt  (X + Y )t .
Proof. Since (X + Y )t  Xs + Ys  Xs + Yt for all 0  s  t, it follows that
(X + Y )t  Xt + Yt: (2.5.6)
Lemma 2.3. Let (Gt)0tT be a continuous ltration and let F  G0 be a -algebra,
and denote by EF and EGt the conditional expectation with respect to F and Gt,
respectively. If At is an increasing process adapted to Gt for 0  t  T , and Xt is a
positive, continuous stochastic process such that EGt [Xt;T ]  C, for all 0  t  T ,
and some constant C, where Xt;T =
XT
Xt
, then
EF
Z T
0
Xt;TdAt

 CEF [AT   A0] :
Proof. Since At is an increasing process, for a partition of [0; T ]: 0 = t
n
0 < t
n
1 <    <
tnn = T , t
n
k =
k
n
T for 1  i  n,
Z T
0
Xt;TdAt = lim
n!1
nX
k=1
Xtnk ;T

Atnk   Atnk 1

: (2.5.7)
Thus,
EF
Z T
0
Xt;TdAt

= EF
"
lim
n!1
nX
k=1
Xtnk ;T

Atnk   Atnk 1
#
; (2.5.8)
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and by Fatou's Lemma and the tower property, the right-hand side is less than or
equal to
lim inf
n!1
EF
"
nX
k=1
Xtnk ;T

Atnk   Atnk 1
#
= lim inf
n!1
EF
"
nX
k=1
EGtn
k

Xtnk ;T
 
Atnk   Atnk 1
#
:
(2.5.9)
Since EGt [Xt;T ]  C for all 0  t  T , (2.5.9) is less than or equal to
C lim inf
n!1
EF
"
nX
k=1

Atnk   Atnk 1
#
= C lim inf
n!1
EF [AT   A0] = CEF [AT   A0] :
(2.5.10)
The proof of Theorem 2.1 is divided into the following two steps. First, any
investment policies X and F satisfy the following:
ESR(
X ; F )  max
  
X
2
2( + 
1 )
;
 
F
2
2
!
= max

1  
2
 
X
2
;
1
2
 
F
2
;
(2.5.11)
which is proved in Lemma 2.4. Second, this upper bound is achieved by the candidate
optimal policies in (2.3.1) and (2.3.2), as proved in Lemma 2.9.
Lemma 2.4. For any investment strategies X and F ,
ESR(
X ; F )   = max

1  
2
 
X
2
;
1
2
 
F
2
:
We prove this lemma for logarithmic utility and power utility, respectively.
Proof of Lemma 2.4 for logarithmic utility :
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For convenience of notation, dene
~Xt =
8<:
0 for t < 0,
1  

F0 +X

t  X0 for t  0.
Then ~Xt is an increasing process, which has a jump at t = 0, and then grows with
Xt . From (2.5.5), Ft =

1 
R T
0
eR
F
t;T d ~Xt, and (2.2.5) can be rewritten as,
lim sup
T!1
1
T
E

ln

1  
Z T
0
eR
F
t;T d ~Xt

= lim sup
T!1
1
T
E

ln
Z T
0
eR
F
t;T d ~Xt

(2.5.12)
=+ lim sup
T!1
1
T
E

ln
Z T
0
e T+R
F
t;T d ~Xt

: (2.5.13)
Since dhWX ;W F it = dt, WXt = W Ft +
p
1  2W?, where W?t is a Brow-
nian Motion independent to W Ft . Denote EW?T as the expectation conditional on 
W?s

0sT (the whole trajectory of W
? until T ). By Lemma 2.5 below,
lim sup
T!1
1
T
E

ln
Z T
0
e T+R
F
t;T d ~Xt

 lim sup
T!1
1
T
E

ln
Z T
0
e
RFt;T 
R T
t

1
2(F )
2
ds+F dWFs

e 
1 
2 (X)
2
t (1 )X(WF )
t d ~Xt

(2.5.14)
= lim sup
T!1
1
T
E

EW?T

ln
Z T
0
e
RFt;T 
R T
t

1
2(F )
2
ds+F dWFs

e 
1 
2 (X)
2
t (1 )X(WF )
t d ~Xt

(2.5.15)
 lim sup
T!1
1
T
E

lnEW?T
Z T
0
e
RFt;T 
R T
t

1
2(F )
2
ds+F dWFs

e 
1 
2 (X)
2
t (1 )X(WF )
t d ~Xt

;
(2.5.16)
where (2.5.15) follows from the tower property of conditional expectation, and (2.5.16)
from Jensen's inequality.
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Next, Lemma 2.6 below implies that e
RF0;t 
R t
0

1
2(F )
2
ds+F dWFs

is a supermartingale
with respect the ltration generated by
 
W Fs

0st and
 
W?s

0sT (the present of
W F and W?, plus the future of W?). Thus,
EW?T ;WFt

e
RFt;T 
R T
t

1
2(F )
2
ds+F dWFs

 1; 80  t  T: (2.5.17)
In addition, At =
R t
0
e 
1 
2 (X)
2
t (1 )X(WF )
t d ~Xt is an increasing process. Thus,
(2.5.17) and Lemma 2.3 imply that
EW?T
Z T
0
e
RFt;T 
R T
t

1
2(
F )
2
ds+F dWFs

e 
1 
2 (
X)
2
t (1 )X(WF )
t d ~Xt

EW?T
Z T
0
e 
1 
2 (
X)
2
t (1 )X(WF )
t d ~Xt

: (2.5.18)
Thus, from (2.5.13) and (2.5.18), it follows that
lim sup
T!1
1
T
E [lnFT ]  + lim sup
T!1
1
T
E

lnEW?T
Z T
0
e 
1 
2 (X)
2
t (1 )X(WF )
t d ~Xt

:
(2.5.19)
Then, Lemma 2.7 below proves that
lim sup
T!1
1
T
E

lnEW?T
Z T
0
e 
1 
2 (X)
2
t (1 )X(WF )
t d ~Xt

 0; (2.5.20)
whence
lim sup
T!1
1
T
E [lnFT ]  ; (2.5.21)
which concludes the proof for logarithmic utility.
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Lemma 2.5. If  = max

1
2
 
F
2
; 1 
2
 
X
2
,
lim sup
T!1
1
T
E

ln
Z T
0
e T eR
F
t;T d ~Xt

 lim sup
T!1
1
T
E

ln
Z T
0
e
RFt;T 
R T
t

1
2(F )
2
ds+F dWFs

e 
1 
2 (X)
2
t (1 )X(WF )
t d ~Xt

:
Proof. Dene the stochastic process NTs = W
F
T  W FT s, for 0  s  T , and note that
NTs has the same distribution as W
F
s . It follows that
lim
T!1
1
T
E
 FNTT   (1  )X  W F T 
= lim
T!1
1
T
E
 FNTT + lim
T!1
1
T
E
 (1  )X  W F 
T

(2.5.22)
= lim
T!1
1
T
E
 FW FT + lim
T!1
1
T
E
 (1  )X jjW FT  = 0; (2.5.23)
where the last equality uses the fact that, for a, b 6= 0,
lim
T!1
1
bT
E [aW T ] = lim
T!1
1
bT
Z 1
0
axp
2T
e 
x2
2T dx = 0: (2.5.24)
Thus,
lim sup
T!1
1
T
E

ln
Z T
0
e T+R
F
t;T d ~Xt

= lim sup
T!1
1
T
E

ln
Z T
0
e T+R
F
t;T d ~Xt

+ lim
T!1
1
T
E
 F  NT 
T
  (1  )X  W F 
T

(2.5.25)
 lim sup
T!1
1
T
E

ln
Z T
0
e T 
F (NT )

T
 (1 )X(WF )
T
+RFt;T d ~Xt

: (2.5.26)
Now, note that NTT  W FT  W Ft , T  12
 
F
2
(T   t) + 1 
2
 
X
2
t and (1  
29
)X
 
W F

T
 (1  )X  W F 
t
, for all 0  t  T . Thus, it follows that
  T   FNTT   (1  )X
 
W F

T
+RFt;T
  1
2
 
F
2
(T   t)  1  
2
 
X
2
t  F  W FT  W Ft   (1  )X  W F t +RFt;T
=RFt;T  
Z T
t

1
2
 
F
2
ds+ FdW Fs

  1  
2
 
X
2
t  (1  )X  W F 
t
:
Plugging this inequality into (2.5.26) yields:
lim sup
T!1
1
T
E

ln
Z T
0
e T eR
F
t;T d ~Xt

 lim sup
T!1
1
T
E

ln
Z T
0
e
RFt;T 
R T
t

1
2(F )
2
ds+F dWFs

  1 
2 (X)
2
t (1 )X(WF )
t d ~Xt

:
(2.5.27)
Lemma 2.6. Let t be adapted to the ltration fFtgt0 generated by
 
WXs

0st and 
W Fs

0st. Dene fGtgt0 as the ltration generated by
 
W Fs

st and
 
WXs

sT .
Then Mt = e
R t
0(sdWFs   122sds) is a supermartingale with respect to fGtgt0.
Proof. Suppose  is a simple process, i.e. t = 
n
i=1i1(ti 1;ti] for a partition of [0,T],
0 = t0 < t1 < t2    < tn = T and i is Fti 1-measurable, for i = 1;    ; n. Then for
any 0  s < t  T ,
EWXT ;WFs
h
e
R t
0 udW
F
u   122udu
i
= e
R s
0 udW
F
u   122uduEWXT ;WFs
h
e
R t
s udW
F
u   122udu
i
: (2.5.28)
Since there exists 1  ks  kt  n such that tks 1  s  tks and tkt 1  t  tkt ,
thus s, t and all the division points in between forms a partition of [s; t], denoted
by s = u0 < u1 < u2    < um = t. Then, since WX and W F are two independent
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Brownian Motions,
EWXT ;WFs
h
e
R t
s (udWFu   122udu)
i
= EWXT ;WFs

e
Pm
i=1 i

WFui WFui 1

  1
2
2i (ui ui 1)

(2.5.29)
=
mY
i=1
EWXT ;WFs

e
i

WFui WFui 1

  1
2
2i (ui ui 1)

= 1; (2.5.30)
and thus,
EWXT ;WFs
h
e
R t
0(udWFu   122udu)
i
= e
R s
0 (udWFu   122udu): (2.5.31)
For a general , from the denition of stochastic integral, there exists a sequence of
simple processes fnt g1n=1, such that
Z t
0

ns dW
F
s  
1
2
(ns )
2 ds

n"1 !
Z t
0

sdW
F
s  
1
2
(s)
2 ds

a.s.; (2.5.32)
hence, for 0  s  t  T ,
EWXT ;WFs
h
e
R t
0(udWFu   122udu)
i
= e
R s
0 (udWFu   122udu)EWXT ;WFs
h
e
R t
s (udWFu   122udu)
i
(2.5.33)
=e
R s
0 (udWFu   122udu)EWXT ;WFs
h
lim inf
n!1
e
R t
s (nudWFu   12 (nu)2du)
i
(2.5.34)
e
R s
0 (udWFu   122udu) lim inf
n!1
EWXT ;WFs
h
e
R t
s (nudWFu   12 (nu)2du)
i
(2.5.35)
=e
R s
0 (udWFu   122udu); (2.5.36)
which conrms that Mt is a supermartingale with respect to fGtgt0.
Lemma 2.7.
lim sup
T!1
1
T
E

lnEW?T
Z T
0
e 
1 
2 (X)
2
t (1 )X(WF )
t d ~Xt

 0:
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Proof. By integration by parts,
Z T
0
e 
1 
2 (X)
2
t (1 )X(WF )
t d ~Xt = F0 +
Z T
0
e 
1 
2 (X)
2
t (1 )X(WF )
t dXt
(2.5.37)
=F0 + e
  1 
2 (X)
2
T (1 )X(WF )
TXT  X0
+
1  
2
 
X
2 Z T
0
e 
1 
2 (X)
2
t (1 )X(WF )
tXt dt
+(1  )X
Z T
0
e 
1 
2 (X)
2
t (1 )X(WF )
tXt d
 
W F

t
: (2.5.38)
Since Xt = e
(1 )RXt , from Lemma 2.2,
e 
1 
2 (X)
2
t (1 )X(WF )
tXt  e
(1 )
0@RX  (X)22  XWF
1A
t : (2.5.39)
Thus, from (2.5.38),
Z T
0
e 
1 
2 (X)
2
t (1 )X(WF )
t d ~Xt
F0 + e(1 )

RX   12(X)
2 XWF

T +
1  
2
 
X
2 Z T
0
e
(1 )

R  12(X)
2 XWF

t dt
+(1  )X
Z T
0
e
(1 )

RX   12(X)
2 XWF

t d
 
W F

t
: (2.5.40)
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Since e
(1 )

RX   12(X)
2 XWF

t  e(1 )

RX   12(X)
2 XWF

T for all t  T ,
1  
2
 
X
2 Z T
0
e
(1 )

R  12(X)
2 XWF

t dt
+(1  )X
Z T
0
e
(1 )

RX   12(X)
2 XWF

t d
 
W F

t
1  
2
 
X
2
e
(1 )

RX   12(X)
2 XWF

TT
+(1  )Xe(1 )

RX   12(X)
2 XWF

T
 
W F

T
(2.5.41)
=

1  
2
 
X
2
T + (1  )X jjW FT

e
(1 )

RX   12(X)
2 XWF

T : (2.5.42)
Thus, from (2.5.40) and (2.5.42),
EW?T
"Z T
0
e 
1 
2 (
X)
2
t (1 )X(WF )
t d ~Xt
#
EW?T

F0 +

1 +
1  
2
 
X
2
T + (1  )X jjWFT

e
(1 )

RX   12 (X)
2 (1 )XWF

T

(2.5.43)
=F0 + EW?T

1 +
1  
2
 
X
2
T + (1  )X jjWFT

e
(1 )

RX   12 (X)
2 (1 )XWF

T

(2.5.44)
F0 + EW?T

LT
 1
 EW?T

K

 1
T
  1

; (2.5.45)
for any  > 1, by Holder's inequality, where
KT =1 +
1  
2
 
X
2
T + (1  )X jjW FT ; (2.5.46)
LT =e
(1 )

RX   12(X)
2 (1 )XWF

T (2.5.47)
Since  > 1 and 
 1 > 1, by Minkowski inequality (E [(f + g)
p]
1
p  E [f p] 1p +
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E [f p]
1
p ), it follows that
EW?T

K

 1
T
  1

1 + 1  
2
 
X
2
T + (1  )X jjEW?T
h 
W FT
 
 1
i  1

(2.5.48)
=1 +
1  
2
 
X
2
T +
p
2(1  )X jj
0@ (1+  12 )p

1A  1 pT : (2.5.49)
Thus from (2.5.45) and (2.5.49), setting
CT = 1 +
1  
2
 
X
2
T +
p
2(1  )X jj
0@ (1+  12 )p

1A  1 pT ; (2.5.50)
for any  > 1,
EW?T
Z T
0
e 
1 
2 (X)
2
t (1 )X(WF )
t d ~Xt

F0 + CTEW?T
"
e
(1 )

RX   12(X)
2 (1 )XWF

T
# 1
: (2.5.51)
Then
lim sup
T!1
1
T
E

lnEW?T
Z T
0
e 
1 
2 (X)
2
t (1 )X(WF )
t d ~Xt

 lim sup
T!1
1
T
E
"
ln
 
F0 + CTEW?T

e
(1 )

RX   12(X)
2 (1 )XWF

T
 1

!#
(2.5.52)
 lim sup
T!1
1
T
lnCT (2.5.53)
+ lim sup
T!1
1
T
E
"
ln
 
F0
CT
+ EW?T

e
(1 )

RX   12(X)
2 (1 )XWF

T
 1

!#
: (2.5.54)
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Note that the limit in (2.5.53) is 0. Since F0
CT
! 0 a.s. as T " 1, for T large enough,
F0
CT
< 1  EW?T

e
(1 )

RX   12(X)
2 (1 )XWF

T
 1

: (2.5.55)
Thus, (2.5.54) is less than or equal to
lim sup
T!1
1
T
E
24ln 2EW?T
"
e
(1 )

RX   12(X)
2 XWF

T
# 135 (2.5.56)
= lim sup
T!1
1
T
E

lnEW?T

e
(1 )

RX   12(X)
2 XWF

T

(2.5.57)
= lim sup
T!1
1
T
E

lnEW?T

e
(1 )

RX   12(X)
2 XWF

T

+ lim inf
T!1
1
T
E
h
 
p
1  2(1  )X  W?
T
i
(2.5.58)
 lim sup
T!1
1
T
E

lnEW?T

e
(1 )

RX   12(X)
2 XWF

T
 
p
1 2(1 )X(W?)
T

:
(2.5.59)
Note that (2.5.58) holds because lim inf
T!1
1
T
E
h
 
p
1  2(1  )X  W?
T
i
= 0,
which follows from (2.5.24). Then, again by Lemma 2.2, the running maximum and
running minimum can be combined, and (2.5.59) is less than or equal to
lim sup
T!1
1
T
E

lnEW?T

e
(1 )

RX   12(X)
2 XWF  
p
1 2XW?

T

= lim sup
T!1
1
T
E

lnEW?T

e
(1 )

RX   12(X)
2 XWX

T

(2.5.60)
 lim sup
T!1
1
T
lnE

e
(1 )

RX   12(X)
2 XWX

T

; (2.5.61)
where (2.5.61) follows from Jensen's inequality and tower property of conditional ex-
pectation. Mt = e
RXt   12(X)
2
t XWXt is a local martingale with respect to the ltration
generated by
 
W Fs

0st and
 
W?s

0st. Then, since M

t  M1, which in turn is
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dominated by a random variable X, and X 1 is uniformly distributed on [0; 1] (cf.
(54) in Guasoni and Ob loj (2012)), for 1 <  < 1
1  , (2.5.61) is less than or equal to
lim sup
T!1
1
T
lnE
h
(M1)
(1 )
i
 lim sup
T!1
1
T
ln
Z 1
0
x (1 )dx

(2.5.62)
= lim sup
T!1
1
T
ln

1
1  (1  )

= 0; (2.5.63)
which concludes the proof.
Proof of Lemma 2.4 for power utility :
For the rest of this chapter, let p = 1  .
Suppose now that the fund manager has an additional source of income, such
that whenever performance fees are paid,  of fees are matched (like a bonus), with
a restriction that this extra income must be invested in the safe asset. Let the
manager's wealth under this schedule be ~Ft, with strategy 
F for private investments,
the dynamics of ~Ft is
d ~Ft =

~Ft    
1   (X

t  X0)
 
Ft 
Fdt+ Ft 
FdW Ft

+(1+)

1  dX

t : (2.5.64)
Solving this SDE and comparing the result to (2.5.5) implies that, with the same F ,
~Ft = F0e
RF;
F
t +

1  
Z t
0
eR
F;F
s;t dXs + 

1   (X

t  X0) (2.5.65)
= Ft + 

1   (X

t  X0) : (2.5.66)
Thus, ~Ft  Ft and ~Ft   1  (Xt  X0) for all t  0, and ESR of F is less than or
equal to ESR of ~F . Lemma 2.8 below shows that this upper bound is also less than
or equal to .
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Lemma 2.8. lim sup
T!1
1
T
lnE
h
~F pT
i 1
p   for all 0 < p < 1.
Proof. Let ~Ft =
( ~Ft  1  (Xt  X0))
~Ft
Ft . Investing 
F
t of ~Ft  1  (Xt  X0) in the risky
asset is equivalent to investing ~Ft of ~Ft. Thus ~
F
t can be regarded as an investment
strategy for ~Ft, and
d ~F pt = p ~F
p 1
t

~Ft    
1   (X

t  X0)
 
Ft 
Fdt+ Ft 
FdW F

+
p(p  1)
2
~F p 2t

~Ft    
1   (X

t  X0)
2  
Ft 
F
2
dt+ (1 + )p ~F p 1t

1  dX

t
(2.5.67)
= p ~F pt

~Ft 
F +
(p  1)
2
 
~Ft 
F
2
dt+ ~Ft 
FdW F

+ (1 + )p ~F p 1t

1  dX

t :
(2.5.68)
Solving this SDE,
~F pT = F
p
0 e
pRF;~
F
T + p(1 + )

1  
Z T
0
epR
F;~F
t;T ~F p 1t dX

t : (2.5.69)
Thus,
lim sup
T!1
1
T
lnE
h
~F pT
i 1
p
= lim sup
T!1
1
T
lnE

F p0 e
pRF;~
F
T + p(1 + )

1  
Z T
0
epR
F;~F
t;T ~F p 1t dX

t
 1
p
: (2.5.70)
Since 0 < p < 1, from Dembo and Zeitouni (1998), Lemma 1:2:15, for any positive
processes ft and gt,
lim sup
T!1
1
T
ln (fT + gT )
1
p = max

lim sup
T!1
1
T
ln f
1
p
T ; lim sup
T!1
1
T
ln g
1
p
T

: (2.5.71)
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It follows that,
lim sup
T!1
1
T
lnE
"
F p0 e
pRF;~
F
T + p(1 + )

1  
Z T
0
epR
F;~F
t;T ~F p 1t dX

t
# 1
p
=max
0@lim sup
T!1
1
T
lnE

F p0 e
pRF;~
F
T
 1
p
; lim sup
T!1
1
T
lnE
"
p(1 + )

1  
Z T
0
epR
F;~F
t;T ~F p 1t dX

t
# 1
p
1A :
(2.5.72)
Note that, since 0 < p < 1, by Holder's inequality,
E

F p0 e
pRF;~
F
T
 1
p
E
264eq
0@ FWFT  (F )22 T
1A375
1
q
 E
264F0e
0@RF;^FT  FWFT  (F )22 T
1A375  F0;
(2.5.73)
where q = p
p 1 . Thus,
lim sup
T!1
1
T
lnE

F p0 e
pRF;~
F
T
 1
p
  lim sup
T!1
1
T
lnE
264eq
0@ FWFT  (F )22 T
1A375
1
q
=
 
F
2
2(1  p) : (2.5.74)
For the second term in (2.5.72), since p < 1, and ~Ft   1  (Xt  X0), ~F p 1t 
p 1
 

1 
p 1
(Xt  X0)p 1, and
E

p(1 + )

1  
Z T
0
epR
F;~F
t;T e pT ~F p 1t dX

t

 p 1(1 + )


1  
p
E
Z T
0
epR
F;~F
t;T  p(T t)e ptp (Xt  X0)p 1 dXt

(2.5.75)
= p 1(1 + )


1  
p
E
Z T
0
epR
F;~F
t;T  p(T t)e ptd (Xt  X0)p

: (2.5.76)
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Since the process At =
R T
0
e ptd (Xt  X0)p is an increasing process, and
Et

epR
F;~F
t;T  p(T t)

 e p2(1 p)(F )
2
(T t) p(T t)  1; (2.5.77)
Lemma 2.3 implies that (2.5.76) is less than or equal to
p 1(1 + )


1  
p
E
Z T
0
e ptd (Xt  X0)p

; (2.5.78)
and hence
lim sup
T!1
1
T
lnE

p(1 + )

1  
Z T
0
epR
F;~
t;T ~F p 1t dX

t
 1
p
=+ lim sup
T!1
1
T
lnE

p(1 + )

1  
Z T
0
epR
F;~
t;T e pT ~F p 1t dX

t
 1
p
(2.5.79)
+ lim sup
T!1
1
T
ln

p 1(1 + )


1  
p
E
Z T
0
e ptd (Xt  X0)p
 1
p
(2.5.80)
=+ lim sup
T!1
1
T
lnE
Z T
0
e ptd (Xt  X0)p
 1
p
: (2.5.81)
Now, integration by parts implies that
Z T
0
e ptd (Xt  X0)p = e pT (XT  X0)p + p
Z T
0
e pt (Xt  X0)p dt
(2.5.82)
 e pT (X)pT + p
Z T
0
e pt (X)pt dt: (2.5.83)
By Lemma 2.2, e pt (X)pt  e(1 )p(R
X   1  )

t , for all 0  t  T , thus (2.5.83) is less
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than or equal to
e(1 )p(R
X   1  )

T + p
Z T
0
e(1 )p(R
X   1  )

t dt
e(1 )p(RX   1  )

T + pTe(1 )p(R
X   1  )

T = (1 + pT ) e(1 )p(R
X   1  )

T : (2.5.84)
Now, Lemma 9 in Guasoni and Ob loj (2012) with '  r = 
1  implies that
lim sup
T!1
1
T
lnE
h
(1 + pT )ep(R
X   1  )

T
i 1
p
= lim sup
T!1
1
T
lnE
h
ep(R
X   1  )

T
i 1
p  0:
(2.5.85)
Thus, (2.5.81) implies
lim sup
T!1
1
T
lnE

p(1 + )

1  
Z T
0
epR
F;~
t;T ~F p 1t dX

t
 1
p
+ lim sup
T!1
1
T
lnE
Z T
0
e ptd (Xt  X0)p
 1
p
+ lim sup
T!1
1
T
lnE
h
(1 + pT )ep(R
X   1  )

T
i 1
p  : (2.5.86)
Then, (2.5.72), (2.5.74), and (2.5.86) imply
lim sup
T!1
1
T
lnE
h
~F pT
i 1
p  max
  
F
2
2(1  p) ; 
!
= : (2.5.87)
To prove Theorem 2.1, it now remains to show that the upper bound in Lemma
2.4 is achieved by the strategies in (2.3.1) and (2.3.2), and hence they are optimal.
Plugging ^X and ^F in the dynamics of Xt and Ft, the fund's value and the manager's
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wealth processes follow
dX^t = X^t
  
X
2
1  (1  )pdt+
X
1  (1  )pdW
X
t
!
  
1  dX^

t ; (2.5.88)
dF^t =

F^t   
1  (X^

t  X0)
  
F
2
1  p dt+
F
1  pdW
F
t
!
+

1  dX^

t : (2.5.89)
Denoting by R^XT =
(1 2(1 )p)(X)2
2(1 (1 )p)2 T +
X
1 (1 )pW
X
T , R^
F
T =
(1 2p)(F )2
2(1 p)2 T +
F
1 (1 )pW
F
T ,
from (2.5.3) to (2.5.5):
X^T = X0e
R^XT  R^XT ; (2.5.90)
X^T = X0e
(1 )R^XT ; (2.5.91)
F^T = F0e
R^FT +

1  (X^

T  X0): (2.5.92)
Lemma 2.9. ESR
 
^X ; ^F

= .
Proof. Let Gt = F0e
R^FT and Ht =

1 

X^t  X0

, then F^T = GT +HT . From Lemma
2.4, it suces to prove that ESR
 
^X ; ^F
  .
Case of logarithmic utility. Since Ht is a positive process,
lim
T!1
1
T
E
h
ln F^T
i
= lim
T!1
1
T
E [ln(GT +HT )]
 lim
T!1
1
T
E [lnGT ] =
 
F
2
2
: (2.5.93)
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Likewise, since Gt is a positive process, by Lemma 2.10,
lim
T!1
1
T
E
h
ln F^T
i
 lim
T!1
1
T
E [lnHT ] = lim
T!1
1
T
E
h
ln

X^T  X0
i
(2.5.94)
= lim
T!1
1
T
E
h
ln

e(1 )R^
X
T   1
i
= lim
T!1
1
T
E
h
(1  )R^XT
i
(2.5.95)
= lim
T!1
1
T
E
"
(1  )
  
X
2
2
+XWX
!
T
#
: (2.5.96)
From Lemma 2.2,
lim
T!1
1
T
E
"
(1  )
  
X
2
2
+XWX
!
T
#
(2.5.97)
(1  )
 
X
2
2
  lim
T!1
1
T
E

(1  )X  WX
T

=
(1  )  X2
2
; (2.5.98)
where the last equality follows from (2.5.24).
Thus,
lim
T!1
1
T
E
h
ln F^T
i
 max
  
F
2
2
;
(1  )  X2
2
!
= : (2.5.99)
Case of p 2 (0; 1). Since Ht is a positive process,
lim
T!1
1
T
lnE
h
F^ pT
i 1
p
= lim
T!1
1
T
lnE [(GT +HT )p]
1
p
 lim
T!1
1
T
lnE [GpT ]
1
p =
 
F
2
2(1  p) : (2.5.100)
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Likewise, since Gt is a positive process, by Lemma 2.10
lim
T!1
1
T
lnE
h
F^ pT
i 1
p  lim
T!1
1
T
lnE [HpT ]
1
p (2.5.101)
= lim
T!1
1
T
lnE
h
X^T  X0
pi 1p
= lim
T!1
1
T
lnE
h
e(1 )R^
X
T   1
pi 1p
(2.5.102)
= lim
T!1
1
T
lnE
h
e(1 )pR^
X
T
i 1
p
=
(1  )  X2
2 (1  (1  )p) : (2.5.103)
where the last equality follows Lemma 11 in Guasoni and Ob loj (2012). Thus,
lim
T!1
1
T
lnE
h
F^ pT
i 1
p  max
  
F
2
2(1  p) ;
(1  )  X2
2 (1  (1  )p)
!
= : (2.5.104)
Lemma 2.10. For R^XT =
(1 2(1 )p)(X)2
2(1 (1 )p)2 T +
X
1 (1 )pW
X
T ,
when p = 1,
lim
T!1
1
T
E
h
ln

e(1 )R^
X
T   1
i
= lim
T!1
1
T
E
h
(1  )R^XT
i
; (2.5.105)
and when 0 < p < 1,
lim
T!1
1
T
lnE
h
e(1 )R^
X
T   1
pi 1p
= lim
T!1
1
T
lnE
h
e(1 )pR^
X
T
i 1
p
: (2.5.106)
Proof. Since e(1 )R^
X
T   1  e(1 )R^XT , the \  " part is straight forward. It suces
to prove the \  " part.
When p = 1, since e(1 )R^
X
T = e(1 )R^
X
T   1 + 1, from concavity of logarithmic
function,
(1  )R^XT = ln e(1 )R^
X
T  ln

e(1 )R^
X
T   1

+
1
e(1 )R^XT   1 (2.5.107)
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Since X > 0, for T large enough, e(1 )R^
X
T = e
(1 )(X)
2
2
T+(1 )XWXT  2e(1 )XWXT ,
and
e(1 )R^
X
T  2e(1 )XWXT  1 + e(1 )XWXT : a.s. (2.5.108)
Thus,
lim
T!1
1
T
E

1
e(1 )R^XT   1

 lim
T!1
1
T
E
h
e (1 )
XWXT
i
= 0: (2.5.109)
Then, (2.5.107) and (2.5.109) imply:
lim
T!1
1
T
E
h
(1  )R^XT
i
 lim
T!1
1
T
E
h
ln

e(1 )R^
X
T   1
i
+ lim
T!1
1
T
E

1
e(1 )R^XT   1

(2.5.110)
 lim
T!1
1
T
E
h
ln

e(1 )R^
X
T   1
i
: (2.5.111)
For 0 < p < 1, from the concavity of the function f(x) = xp,
e(1 )pR^
X
T 

e(1 )R^
X
T   1
p
+ p

e(1 )R^
X
T   1
p 1
: (2.5.112)
Thus, from Lemma 1.2.15 in Dembo and Zeitouni (1998),
lim
T!1
1
T
lnE
h
(1  )pR^XT
i 1
p
 lim
T!1
1
T
lnE

e(1 )R^
X
T   1
p
+ p

e(1 )R^
X
T   1
p 1 1p
(2.5.113)
=max
 
lim
T!1
1
T
lnE
h
e(1 )R^
X
T   1
pi 1p
; lim
T!1
1
T
lnE

p

e(1 )R^
X
T   1
p 1 1p!
:
(2.5.114)
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Since 0 < p < 1, by (2.5.108),
lim
T!1
1
T
E

p

e(1 )R^
X
T   1
p 1 1p
 lim
T!1
1
T
E
h
pe(1 )(p 1)
XWXT
i 1
p
= 0: (2.5.115)
Thus, (2.5.114) and (2.5.115) imply:
lim
T!1
1
T
lnE
h
e(1 )pR^
X
T
i 1
p  max

lim
T!1
1
T
lnE
h
e(1 )R^
X
T   1
pi 1p
; 0

(2.5.116)
 lim
T!1
1
T
lnE
h
e(1 )R^
X
T   1
pi 1p
; (2.5.117)
because, again, by (2.5.108),
lim
T!1
1
T
lnE
h
e(1 )R^
X
T   1
pi 1p
 lim
T!1
1
T
lnE
h
e(1 )p
XWXT
i 1
p
=
 
(1  )X2 p
2
> 0 (2.5.118)
Chapter 3
Optimal Consumption and Investment in
Incomplete Markets
3.1 Introduction
Many models of dynamics describing the interest rate and risky assets prices have
been proposed as extensions of Merton's setting, in order to describe the stylized
facts in nancial markets. Hull and White (1987); Stein and Stein (1991) discuss
the case when assets have stochastic volatilities, Kim and Omberg (1996) consider
assets with stochastic expected returns, and in Buraschi, Porchia and Trojani (2010),
the expected returns are functions of volatilities, which in turn are stochastic. In a
complete market, where any random payo can be replicated by portfolios of traded
assets, consumption and investment problems are solved in closed form by Wachter
(2002); Munk and Srensen (2004), and in terms of ODEs by Liu (2007), via solu-
tions of the associated HJB equations. Due to the complexity of the resulting HJB
equations, solutions to the incomplete case are far from satisfactory.
This chapter aims at setting up a framework of consumption and portfolio op-
timization problems in incomplete markets, using combined arguments of stochastic
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control and duality theory. Section 3.2 builds the model in which agents invest in
the risk-free asset and multiple risky assets, and consume continuously in an optimal
way, in order to maximize power utility from consumption with innite horizon. The
coecients of SDEs that describe the dynamics of risky asset prices are functions of
state variables, which are also stochastic and partially correlated with asset prices.
This setup is quite general in that it encompasses all the above extensions of Merton's
setting as special cases.
Section 3.3 gives the primal (lower) and dual (upper) bounds for the value function,
i.e. the maximized utility at nite horizons, and a verication theorem which proves
that both the primal and dual bounds can be represented in terms of the solution to
the associated HJB equation. Thus, the condition for optimality: the primal bound
equals the dual bound, can also be translated into conditions on this solution to the
HJB equation.
Since most model specications do not come with closed form solutions of the HJB
equations, it is not easy to check the optimality condition provided in the verication
theorem, let alone analyzing the eects of model parameters on the optimal strategies.
Thus, in the case of a single state variable, Section 3.4 gives a method to calculate
approximate strategies in closed form, which are optimal in the case of complete
markets or logarithmic utility. With the approximate solution, the agent adopts the
optimal strategies in an articial and complete market, in which the interest rate
and state variable follow dierent dynamics, and excess returns of risky assets remain
the same. Bounds for the Certainty Equivalent Loss (CEL) and relative error in
consumption, both of which measure the performance of approximate strategies, are
also calculated in closed form. Section 3.5 shows two examples of incomplete market
models: I. Stochastic expected returns and volatilities, and II. Stochastic interest
rate, to which the approximation method can be applied.
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All proofs are in Section 3.6.
3.2 Model
3.2.1 Market
Consider a nancial market with a risk-free asset S0 and n risky assets S = (S1; : : : ; Sn),
and investment opportunities depend on k state variables Y =
 
Y 1; : : : ; Y k
 2 E
where E  Rk is an open connected set:
dS0t
S0t
=r(Yt)dt; (3.2.1)
dSit
Sit
=r(Yt)dt+ dR
i
t; 1  i  n; (3.2.2)
dRit =i(Yt)dt+
nX
j=1
ij(Yt)dZ
j
t ; 1  i  n; (3.2.3)
dY it =bi(Yt)dt+
kX
j=1
aij(Yt)dW
j
t ; 1  i  k; (3.2.4)
dhZi;W jit =ij(Yt)dt; 1  i  n; 1  j  k: (3.2.5)
Z = (Z1; : : : ; Zn) and W =
 
W 1; : : : ;W k

are multivariate Brownian Motions
with correlation matrix . Thus,
dZt = (Yt)dWt + (Yt)dBt (3.2.6)
where B = (B1; : : : ; Bn) is an n-dimensional Brownian Motion independent to W ,
and  2 Rnn satises 0 + 0 = In.
Denote the covariance matrices by  = 0 = dhR;Rit=dt, A = aa0 = dhY; Y it=dt
and  = a0 = dhR; Y it=dt. Then, 0 1 characterize the degree of incomplete-
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ness of the market. 0 1 = A means complete markets and  = 0 means fully
incomplete markets.
Denote by Cm;(E;Rk) the class of Rk valued functions on E with locally -
Holder continuous partial derivatives of mth-order, and Cm(E;Rk)(resp. Cmc (E;Rk))
the class of Rk valued functions with continuous partial derivatives of mth-order (resp.
with compact support) on E. When m = 0 or k = 1, the superscripts are dropped,
so that C0(E;R1) is denoted as C(E;R), and when functions are non-negative, R+ is
used instead of R. The following assumption ensures that the model coecients are
regular and non-degenerate:
Assumption 3.1. For some  2 (0; 1), r 2 C(E;Rk), b 2 C1;(E;Rk),  2
C1;(E;Rn), A 2 C2;(E;Rkk),  2 C2;(E;Rnn) and  2 C2;(E;Rnk). The
symmetric matrices A and  are positive denite for all y 2 E.
Next is an important concept in this chapter: martingale problems.
Denition 3.2. (Denition 2.2 in Cheridito, Filipovic and Yor (2005)) Let 
 be the
space of cadlag functions ! : R+ ! E, where E is an open and connected subset in
Rn, n > 0. (Xt)t0 is the coordinate process, dened by
Xt(!) = !(t); t  0; (3.2.7)
which generates the -algebra
B = fXt; t  0g; (3.2.8)
and the ltration (Bt)t0, where
Bt = fXt; 0  s  tg: (3.2.9)
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Let  and  be measurable mappings from E, with values in the set of n  n
positive-semi denite matrices and Rn, respectively, and bounded on every compact
subset of E. Dene the operator L as:
L =
1
2
nX
i;j=1
i;j(x)
@2
@xi@xj
+
nX
i=1
i(x)
@
@xi
: (3.2.10)
A probability measure P on (
;B) is the solution to the martingale problem for
L, if for all f 2 C2c (E;R),
M ft = f(Xt)  f(X0) 
Z t
0
Lf(Xs)ds (3.2.11)
is a P-martingale with respect to (Bt)t0.
The next assumption ensures the uniqueness of solutions to the associated mar-
tingale problem:
Assumption 3.3. There is a unique solution P to the martingale problem for:
L =
1
2
n+kX
i;j=1
~Ai;j(x)
@2
@xi@xj
+
n+kX
i=1
~bi(x)
@
@xi
; (3.2.12)
where ~A =
0B@  
0 A
1CA and ~b =
0B@ 
b
1CA.
Note that P depends on the initial value Y0 = y and should be denoted as P
y,
but since the following argument will not involve dierent initial values of Y , for the
rest of this chapter, we drop the superscript y for dierent probability measures, for
ease of notation. Denote by E the expectation under P .
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Now, dene (Ft)t0 by Ft = Bt+ =
\
s>t
Bs, which is the right continuous envelope of
(Bt)t0. By Theorem 2:8 in Revuz and Yor (2001),M ft = f(Xt) f(X0) 
R t
0
Lf(Xs)ds
is also a martingale with respect to Ft.
Next is the denition of the risk premium  for non-traded risk:
Denition 3.4. The set of non-traded risk premium R consists of all F-adapted
 2 Rk, such that
Zt = E
Z 
0
   0 1 + 00 1dZs + Z 
0
0adWs

t
(3.2.13)
is an F-martingale under P .
For the rest of the chapter, assume that R is non-empty, which is proved to be
equivalent to the absence of arbitrage opportunities, in the sense of no free lunch with
vanishing risk, in Delbaen and Schachermayer (1994). Note that, for each  2 R, the
corresponding stochastic discount factor is Mt = e
R t
0  rdsZt , and M

t S
i
t is a local
martingale, for all 0  i  n.
3.2.2 Preferences
With initial wealth x, an agent trades according to t = (
1
t ; : : : ; 
n
t ), which represents
the proportions of wealth X invested in each risky asset at time t, with the rest into
the risk-free asset. The agent also consumes at a continuous rate ct = ltXt. The
corresponding wealth process X;c follows:
dX;ct
X;ct
= rdt+ 0tdRt   ltdt: (3.2.14)
The agent's goal is to maximize power utility from consumption with innite
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horizon:
max
(;c)2A
E
Z 1
0
e t
c1 t
1   dt

; (3.2.15)
where  > 0,  6= 1 is the investor's relative risk aversion and  > 0 is the subjective
time-preference parameter. The choice of  and c are restricted to the admissible set
A:
Denition 3.5. The set of admissible trading and consumption strategies A consists
of all pairs of F-adapted processes (; c), where  is integrable with respect to Rt,
c  0, and the associated wealth process X;c satises:
X;ct  0 for all t  0 a.s. (3.2.16)
Remark 3.6. For any  2 R,
d (Mt Xt) =
 
0   0 1   00 1dBt +   0   0 1   00 1+ 0a dWt
 Mt ctdt: (3.2.17)
Thus, for all (; c) 2 A, Mt Xt +
R t
0
Ms csds is a non-negative local martingale, and
thus a super martingale. Therefore,
E
Z t
0
Ms csds

 x; (3.2.18)
and in the limit as t " 1,
E
Z 1
0
Ms csds

 x: (3.2.19)
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Since this holds true for all  2 R,
sup
2R
E
Z 1
0
Ms csds

 x: (3.2.20)
For any (; c) 2 A, there is an upper bound for utility from consumption until
any nite time T:
Lemma 3.7. For any (; c) 2 A,  2 R and T > 0,
E
Z T
0
e t
c1 t
1   dt

 x
1 
1  E
Z T
0
e 


t (Mt )
 1
 dt

: (3.2.21)
The right-hand side of (3.2.21) is called the primal bound for this optimization
problem, and the left-hand side is called the dual bound. The limit of the primal
and dual bounds as T " 1 give the lower and upper bound for the value function. If
there exist ^, c^ and ^ such that
E
Z 1
0
e t
c^1 t
1   dt

=
x1 
1  E
Z 1
0
e 


t

M ^t
  1

dt

(3.2.22)
then ^, c^ and ^ are the optimal portfolio, optimal consumption and market price of
the non-traded risk from W for agents with relative risk aversion , respectively.
3.3 Optimal Solution
3.3.1 Finite Horizon Bounds
Since maximization with respect to the dollar amount consumption c is equivalent to
maximization with respect to the consumption-wealth ratio l, the rest of this chapter
uses l as a control variable, instead of c, for ease of notation.
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Conjecturing that the value function is of the form V (x; y) = x
1 
1  f(y)
 , the HJB
equation is

   1 =
rf 0b
(1  )f +
tr(AD2f)
2(1  )f  
( + 1)rf 0Arf
2(1  )f2   sup;l

r + 0  
2
0   0rf
f
+
f l1 
1     l

: (3.3.1)
The rst order conditions are
 =
1

 1   1rf
f
; (3.3.2)
l = f: (3.3.3)
Plugging (3.3.2) and (3.3.3) back to the HJB equation yields:
f =
rf 0

b+
(1 )

0 1

f
  rf
0  (1 + )A+ (1  )0 1rf
2f2
+
tr(AD2f)
2f
+


  (1  )
0 1
22
  (1  )r

:
If there exists a twice-dierentiable solution f to the HJB equation, then the
following theorem gives a representation of the primal and dual bounds in term of f ,
at nite horizons.
Theorem 3.8. Assume that:
(i) f 2 C2(E;R+) solves the HJB equation
f =
rf 0

b+
(1 )

0 1

f
  rf
0  (1 + )A+ (1  )0 1rf
2f2
+
tr(AD2f)
2f
+


  (1  )
0 1
22
  (1  )r

;
(3.3.4)
(ii) There is a unique solution P^ (called myopic probability) to the martingale problem
for:
L^ =
1
2
n+kX
i;j=1
~Ai;j(x)
@2
@xi@xj
+
n+kX
i=1
b^i(x)
@
@xi
; (3.3.5)
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where ~A =
0B@  
0 A
1CA and b^ =
0B@   rff
b+ (1 )
0 1

  (A+ (1  )0 1) rf
f
1CA.
Then, the input (; l; ):
t =
 1

   1rf
f
; lt = f(Yt); t =  rf
f
(3.3.6)
satises
E
Z T
0
e t
c1 t
1   dt

=
x1 
1   f(y)
 

1  EP^
h
e 
R T
0 f(Ys)ds
i
; (3.3.7)
x1 
1  E
Z T
0
e 


t (Mt )
 1
 dt

=
x1 
1   f(y)
 

1  EP^
h
e 
R T
0 f(Ys)ds
i
: (3.3.8)
Remark 3.9. P^ is called the myopic measure, because under P^ , the optimal strategy
for an agent with logarithmic utility is t =
 1

  0 1rf
f
, which is the same as
the candidate policy for an agent with power utility under the physical measure P in
this theorem (c.f. Guasoni and Robertson (2012)).
3.3.2 Long Run Optimality
From Theorem 3.8, the dual and primal bounds can be expressed in terms of the
solution f to the associated HJB equation. Then the sucient condition for optimality
- the dual and primal bounds coincide at T =1 translates into conditions on f :
Corollary 3.10. (; l; ) in (3.3.6) is optimal if
Z 1
0
f(Yt)dt =1 a.s.; (3.3.9)
and the value function is x
1 
1  f(y)
 .
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Based on Corollary 3.10, the next proposition gives sucient conditions that guar-
antees
R1
0
f(Yt)dt =1, and thus optimality.
Proposition 3.11. If, in addition to the assumptions of Theorem 3.8,
(i) Under P^ , Y is positive recurrent, and thus has an invariant probability  on
E.
(ii)
R
E
f(y)(dy) > 0.
Then,
R1
0
f(Yt)dt =1 a.s., and thus, (; l; ) in (3.3.6) is optimal.
3.4 Approximate Optimality in Incomplete Markets
The results in Section 3.3 link the optimal policies to solutions of the associated HJB
equations. Without solutions in closed form, it is not easy to check conditions for the
optimality, such as the one in Corollary 3.10, or to analyze properties of the optimal
consumption and portfolio, and economic implications of each model. Unfortunately,
the HJB equations for most non-trivial models of incomplete markets do not have
closed form solutions, and approximation is needed. In this section, we propose an
approximation method in the case when there is only one state variable:
Assumption 3.12. Let Assumption 3.1 and 3.3 hold. Further, assume that:
(i) E = (a; b) with  1  a < b  1,
(ii) 0 = 0 1=A is a constant.
Under Assumption 3.12, with the change of variable f = g 
1
m and m =  + (1 
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)0, the HJB equation becomes:
g 
1
m +

b+ (1 )

0 1

gy
mg
+
Agyy
2mg
  

+
(1  )0 1
22
+
(1  )r

= 0: (3.4.1)
This power transformation was rst introduced by Zariphoupoulou (1999) to e-
liminate non-linear terms in the HJB equation, and works well for maximization of
utility from consumption in complete markets or from terminal wealth. But for many
non-trivial model specications of incomplete markets, this ordinary dierential e-
quation (ODE) does not have a closed form solution. But ODEs of the following
form
g 1 +

b+ (1 )

0 1

gy
g
+
Agyy
2g
  

+
(1  )0 1
22
+
(1  )r

= 0; (3.4.2)
usually have closed form solutions, and after plugging the solution g into the HJB
equation (3.4.1) as an approximate solution, the error is small when 0 is close to
1, i.e. when the market is nearly complete, because when 0 = 1, or equivalently
m = 1, this equation coincides with (3.4.1). Based on this observation, the next
theorem gives an estimate for the dual bound.
Theorem 3.13. In addition to Assumption 3.1, 3.3 and 3.12, for m = +(1 )0,
assume:
(i) There exists gD 2 C2 (E;R+) that solves the ODE gD(y) 1 + HgD(y) = 0,
where
Hg(y) =

b+
(1  )0 1


gy
g
+
Agyy
2g
+
(1  )0 1
22
  

+
(1  )r

; (3.4.3)
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(ii) There is a unique solution PD to the martingale problem for:
L =
1
2
2X
i;j=1
~Ai;j(x)
@2
@xi@xj
+
2X
i=1
bDi(x)
@
@xi
; (3.4.4)
where ~A =
0B@  
0 A
1CA, bD =
0B@  +gDygD
b+ (1 )
0 1

+mA
gDy
gD
1CA.
(iii)
R1
0
gD(Yt)
 1dt =1 a.s.
Then, with t =
gDy
gD
, the dual bound satises
min
2R
x1 
1  E
Z 1
0
e 

 (Mt )
 1
 dt

 x
1 
1   g
D(y): (3.4.5)
Note that when 0 = 1, m = 1, and gD also solves (3.4.1). Thus, since
Z 1
0
gD(Yt)
 1dt =1 a:s:;
from Corollary 3.10, the bound in (3.4.5) coincides with the value function, and hence
the estimate is sharp.
Once there is an upper bound for the minimum dual bounds in (3.4.5), in order
to nd good approximate policies for the utility maximization problem, it suces to
nd (; c), such that the corresponding primal bound is close to (3.4.5). The following
theorem gives such a candidate.
Theorem 3.14. In addition to Assumption 3.1, 3.3 and 3.12, assume there exists
F 2 C(E;R+), such that:
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(i) There exists gP 2 C2 (E;R+) that solves the ODE gP (y) 1 + Hg(y) + (m  
1)AF (y) = 0, where the operator H is dened in Theorem 3.13,
(ii)

gPy
gP
2
 2F ,
(iii) There is a unique solution P P to the martingale problem for:
L =
1
2
2X
i;j=1
~Ai;j(x)
@2
@xi@xj
+
2X
i=1
bPi(x)
@
@xi
; (3.4.6)
where ~A =
0B@  
0 A
1CA, bP =
0B@  +gPygP
b+ (1 )
0 1

+mA
gPy
gP
1CA,
(iv)
R1
0
gP (Yt)
 1dt =1 a.s.
Then, with lt = g
P (Yt)
 1 and t =
 1

+ 1g
P
y
gP
, the corresponding utility from
consumption satises:
E
Z 1
0
e t
c1 t
1   dt

 x
1 
1   g
P (y) (3.4.7)
Remark 3.15. When m = 1, (3.4.1) is the HJB equation in the complete market
case. A comparison to this equation implies that gD(y) 1 + HgD(y) = 0 in Theorem
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3.13 is actually the HJB equation in the following complete market:
dS0t
S0t
=r(Yt)dt (3.4.8)
dSit
Sit
=r(Yt)dt+ dR
i
t; 1  i  n; (3.4.9)
dRit =i(Yt)dt+
nX
j=1
ij(Yt)dZ
j
t ; 1  i  n; (3.4.10)
dYt =

b(Yt) +

1  1p
0

(1  )0 1


dt+ a(Yt)dWt; (3.4.11)
dhZi;W it = ip
0
dt; 1  i  n: (3.4.12)
while the agent's relative risk aversion is , and the subjective time-preference pa-
rameter is . In this articial market, 0 = 1, and is therefore complete. The state
variable Y follows a dierent SDE, while the risk-free rate and excess returns of risky
assets remain the same as in the original market. With  suggested in Theorem 3.13,
M is the stochastic discount factor in this complete market for agents with relative
risk aversion .
On the other hand, gP (y) 1 + HgP (y) + (m   1)AF (y) = 0 in Theorem 3.14 is
actually the HJB equation in the following complete market:
dS0t
S0t
=(r(Yt) +  (
0  1)A(Yt)F (Yt)) dt (3.4.13)
dSit
Sit
=(r(Yt) +  (
0  1)A(Yt)F (Yt)) dt+ dRit; 1  i  n; (3.4.14)
dRit =i(Yt)dt+
nX
j=1
ij(Yt)dZ
j
t ; 1  i  n; (3.4.15)
dYt =

b(Yt) +

1  1p
0

(1  )0 1


dt+ a(Yt)dWt; (3.4.16)
dhZi;W it = ip
0
dt; 1  i  n: (3.4.17)
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while the agent's relative risk aversion is , and the subjective time-preference param-
eter is . This articial market is complete, with the interest rate and state variable
Yt following dierent dynamics, while excess returns of risky assets remain the same
as in the original market. The candidate consumption and portfolio in Theorem 3.14
are optimal in this articial and complete market.
Next dene a measure of welfare loss from the optimum by the approximate poli-
cies.
Denition 3.16. (Certainty Equivalent Loss) For an agent with relative risk aversion
, subjective time-preference parameter  and initial wealth x, let V (x) be the value
function, i.e. the maximum utility from consumption, then CEL(; l) is the Certainty
Equivalent Loss (CEL) of any admissible investment and consumption strategy (; l)
if the corresponding utility from consumption satises:
E
264Z 1
0
e t

ltX
;l
t
1 
1   dt
375 = V (x(1  CEL(; l))) : (3.4.18)
From the denition, the utility from consumption by adopting a suboptimal strat-
egy (; l) is equivalent to losing CEL(; l) of initial wealth, using the optimal strategy.
The larger CEL(; l) is, the worse (; l) performs.
Proposition 3.17. If assumptions in Theorem 3.13 and 3.14 hold, CEL of the s-
trategies ^ = 
 1

+  1g
P
y
gP
, and l^t = g
P (Yt)
 1 satises:
0  CEL(^; l^)  1 

gP (y)
gD(y)
 
1 
: (3.4.19)
Note when 0 = 1 or  = 1, m = 1 and gD = gP , both of which solve the
HJB equation (3.4.1), hence CEL(^; l^) = 0. Thus, in the case of complete markets
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or logarithmic utility, the estimate recovers the optimal solution. When 0 or  is
close to 1, or equivalently, when the market is nearly complete or the agent's utility
is nearly logarithmic, the error is small.
3.5 Example
This section gives two examples of specic models to which the approximation method
in Theorem 3.13 and 3.14 can be applied.
3.5.1 Stochastic Expected Returns and Volatilities
The rst example is a model in which the interest rate is constant, while expected
returns and volatilities of risky asset prices both depend on one state variable Y ,
and thus are stochastic, where Y follows a square root diusion, described in Feller
(1951):
dS0t
S0t
=rdt; (3.5.1)
dSit
Sit
=rdt+ dRit; 1  i  n; (3.5.2)
dRit =iYtdt+
nX
j=1
ij
p
YtdZ
j
t ; 1  i  n; (3.5.3)
dYt =b(   Yt)dt+ a
p
YtdWt; (3.5.4)
dhZi;W it =idt; 1  i  n: (3.5.5)
where  = (1;    ; n)0,  = (1;    ; n)0 2 Rn, r, , b, and A = a2 > 0 are all
constants. Z = (Z1;    ; Zn) and W are n- and 1-dimensional multivariate Brownian
Motions. Denote covariance matrices as  = a 2 Rn and  = 0 2 Rnn, which
is positive denite.
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Assume b  A
2
, so that starting from Y0 = y > 0, Yt > 0 a.s. for all t  0 (c.f.
Cox, Ingersoll and Ross (1985)). Also assume 0 < 1 so that the market is incomplete.
The agent has risk aversion  > 1, and maximizes utility from consumption with
innite horizon. Thus, m =  + (1  )0 > 1.
The rst lemma guarantees closed form solutions of the ODEs in Theorem 3.13
and 3.14 for this model.
Lemma 3.18. For constants k 2 R,  > 0, A > 0, d > 0 and K > 0, the ODE
g 1 + ( ky + ) gy
g
+
Aygyy
2g
  dy  K = 0 (3.5.6)
has a solution
g(y) =
Z 1
0
h(y; t)dt; (3.5.7)
where
h(y; t) = eC(t) B(t)y; (3.5.8)
B(t) = 2d
et   1
et(k + )  k + ; (3.5.9)
C(t) = 4d
ln ((k + )et   k + )  ln 2  1
2
(k + )t
k2   2  Kt; (3.5.10)
 =
p
k2 + 2dA: (3.5.11)
The next two propositions prove that all the assumptions in Theorem 3.13 and
3.14 are satised.
Proposition 3.19. The model (3.5.1)-(3.5.5) satises all the assumptions in The-
orem 3.13 and 3.14. In particular, let k = b   (1 )0 1

and K = +( 1)r

,
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gD(y) =
R1
0
eC(t) B(t)ydt, where
B(t) = 2d
et   1
et(k + )  k + ; (3.5.12)
C(t) = 4db
ln ((k + )et   k + )  ln 2  1
2
(k + )t
k2   2  Kt; (3.5.13)
d =
(   1)0 1
22
; (3.5.14)
 =
p
k2 + 2dA: (3.5.15)
and gP (y) =
R1
0
e
C(t)  B(t)ydt, where
B(t) = 2 d
et   1
et(k + )  k + ; (3.5.16)
C(t) = 4 db
ln ((k + )et   k + )  ln 2  1
2
(k + )t
k2   2  Kt; (3.5.17)
d =
(   1)0 1
22
  (m  1)AQ; (3.5.18)
 =
p
k2 + 2 dA; (3.5.19)
and the constant Q solves the following equation3:
2 d2
(k + )2
= Q: (3.5.20)
Corollary 3.20. The approximate optimal consumption l(Yt) = g
P (Yt)
 1 is an in-
creasing function in Yt, r, and .
Proof. gP (y) is decreasing in y, because y's coecient B(t) in the exponential func-
tion is non-negative. Since r and  only appear in C(t), and both have negative
coecients, gP (y) is decreasing in r and . Thus l(Yt) = g
P (Yt)
 1 is increasing in Yt,
r, and .
3This is a polynomial of Q, and the root that leads to a larger primal bound is used.
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Parameter   b  a r  
Value 1.16 0.95 0.18 0.044 0.047 0.028 -0.72 0.02
Table 3.1: Parameters for the model of stochastic expected returns and volatilities,
with the real dividend yield of S&P composite as the state variable. Except for
, parameters are estimated using Shiller's data from 1871 to 2010, by matching
quadratic variations and moments of the state variable's stationary distribution.
Let R be the real return in S&P composite, r the real interest rate and state
variable Y the real dividend yield of S&P composite, parameters for the model (3.5.1)-
(3.5.5) with one risky asset, as summarized in Table 3.1, are estimated using Shiller's
data from 1871 to 2010 4, by matching quadratic variations and moments of the state
variable's stationary distribution5.
Figure 3.1 shows the upper bound of the CEL of approximate strategies ^ =
 1

+  1g
P
y
gP
, and l^t = g
P (Yt)
 1 in Proposition 3.17 with  1    1,  = 4, Y
at the mean of its stationary distribution and other parameters in Table 3.1. The
graph conrms that in complete market case, i.e. when  = 1 or  1, the approximate
strategies have a CEL = 0, and thus are optimal. The largest CEL appears around
 =  0:3, which leads to a loss of less than 0:4% of the initial wealth for investors
using the approximate strategies. Results with  = 2, 6, 8 and 10 (not reported here)
show the same pattern, and the largest CEL is always less than 0:4%, which indicate
that the approximation is very close to the optimum.
Figure 3.2 shows the upper bound of the CEL of approximate strategies with
1    15, Y at the mean of its stationary distribution and other parameters in
Table 3.1. The graph conrms that in logarithmic utility case, i.e. when  = 1, the
approximate strategies have a CEL = 0, and thus are optimal. Relative risk aversion
 > 1 has two opposite eects on the CEL: 1) As  increases, m =  + (1   )2 is
4 http://www.econ.yale.edu/ shiller/data/chapt26.xls.
5In the model (3.5.1)-(3.5.5), Y is a square root process. Thus, the stationary distribution of Y
is a Gamma distribution, with the shape parameter 2ba2 and the scale parameter
a2
2b .
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Figure 3.1: The upper bound of the CEL (vertical axis, in percentage) of approximate
strategies in the model of stochastic expected returns and volatilities against corre-
lation coecient  1    1 (horizontal axis), with  = 1:16,  = 0:95, b = 0:18,
Y =  = 0:044, a = 0:047, r = 0:028,  = 0:02 and  = 4.
farther from 1, and the ODE which gP solves in Theorem 3.14 deviates further from
the HJB equation (3.4.1). Thus, the error, or equivalently, the CEL of approximate
strategies based on gP is larger; 2) As the investor becomes more risk averse, less
of wealth is invested in the risky asset. Thus, the untraded risk in the stochastic
investment opportunities has less impact on the welfare when using approximate
strategies, and the CEL becomes smaller. The combined eect leads the CEL to rst
increase, until reaching the maximum around  = 4 (the case shown in Figure 3.1),
which indicates a loss of less than 0:25% of the initial wealth for investors using the
approximate strategies, and then decrease with . This result also conrms the result
in Figure 3.1 that the approximation is very close to the optimum.
Corollary 3.10 implies that with optimal strategies t =
 1

   1rf
f
, and
lt = f(Yt), the value function is
x1 
1  f(y)
 . Then, Theorem 3.13 and 3.14 indicate
that
x1 
1   g
P (y)  x
1 
1   f(y)
   x
1 
1   g
D(y): (3.5.21)
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Figure 3.2: The upper bound of the CEL (vertical axis, in percentage) of approximate
strategies in the model of stochastic expected returns and volatilities against relative
risk aversion 1    15 (horizontal axis), with  = 1:16,  = 0:95, b = 0:18,
Y =  = 0:044, a = 0:046, r = 0:028,  = 0:02 and  =  0:72.
Since  > 1, this inequality gives lower and upper bounds for the optimal con-
sumption: gP (y) 1  f(y)  gD(y) 1, and an upper bound for the relative error:
gD(y) 1 gP (y) 1
gP (y) 1 . Figure 3.3 shows the lower and upper bounds of optimal consump-
tion for Y within two standard deviations from the mean of its stationary distribution,
with parameters in Table 3.1, and  = 2, 4, 6, 8 and 10. The upper and lower bounds
for each value of  is very close, with the largest error appearing at  = 4, of less
than 1 basis point. Figure 3.4 shows the upper bound for the relative error for dif-
ferent values of .  = 6 leads to the largest relative error, around 0:2%. Both the
narrow bounds for the optimal consumption and small relative error indicate that the
approximate policy gP (Yt)
 1 is very close to the optimal consumption.
With  = 4 and other parameters in Table 3.1, Figure 3.5 shows the approximate
consumption gP (Y ) 1 and the Merton consumption assuming that the state variable
stays at the current level, for Y within two standard deviations from the mean of its
stationary distribution. In this model of stochastic expected returns and volatilities,
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Figure 3.3: The lower and upper bounds of the optimal consumption (vertical axis,
in percentage) in the model of stochastic expected returns and volatilities for Y
(horizontal axis) within two standard deviations from the mean of its stationary
distribution, with  = 1:16,  = 0:95, b = 0:18,  = 0:044, a = 0:046, r = 0:028,
 = 0:02, and  = 2 (solid line), 4 (dashed line), 6 (dotted line), 8 (dot-dashed line)
and 10 (thick line), respectively.
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Figure 3.4: The upper bound of the relative errors (vertical axis, in percentage) in the
approximate consumption in the model of stochastic expected returns and volatilities
for Y (horizontal axis) within two standard deviations from the mean of its stationary
distribution, with  = 1:16,  = 0:95, b = 0:18,  = 0:044, a = 0:046, r = 0:028,
 = 0:02, and  = 2 (solid line), 4 (dashed line), 6 (dotted line), 8 (dot-dashed line)
and 10 (thick line), respectively.
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an increase in Y indicates better investment opportunities (higher Sharpe ratio), and
has two opposite eects on the investor's consumption: 1) income eect. With better
investment opportunities, the investor expects to earn more from investment and
become richer, and thus is willing to consume more; 2) substitution eects. Since
investment opportunities are better, the investor is willing to consume less and save
for investment. Figure 3.5 indicates that the income eect dominates, since both the
Merton consumption and the approximate consumption increase in Y . Comparing
to the Merton consumption, the nearly optimal approximate consumption (as shown
in Figure 3.3 and 3.4, for  = 4, the absolute and relative errors are less than 1
basis point and 0:1%, respectively) is larger when Y is small and smaller when Y
is large, which implies that the investor is more conservative regarding changes in
investment opportunities in this stochastic setting, because Y is mean-reverting. The
approximate consumption at Y 's long run mean is much lower than the Merton
consumption corresponding to this average investment opportunities, which indicates
that the precautionary saving eect is large.
With the same parameter set, the Merton portfolio is a constant 
2
= 32:13%.
Figure 3.6 shows that the approximate portfolio t =
 1

+ 1g
P
y
gP
decreases slowly
with the state variable Y , but is always riskier than when the investment opportunities
are constant. This extra investment in the risky asset is due to the fact that the risky
asset is negatively correlated with the dividend yield, of which an increase indicates
better investment opportunities, and thus, in addition to the Merton portfolio, the
investor wants to hold more of this risky asset, in order to hedge against changes in
the dividend yield.
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Figure 3.5: The approximate (solid line) and the Merton consumption assuming that
the state variable Y stays at current level (dashed line) in the model of stochastic
expected returns and volatilities (vertical axis, in percentage), for Y (horizontal axis)
within two standard deviations from the mean of its stationary distribution, with
 = 1:16,  = 0:95, b = 0:18,  = 0:044, a = 0:046, r = 0:028,  = 0:02, and  = 4.
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Figure 3.6: The approximate portfolio (vertical axis, in percentage) in the model
of stochastic expected returns and volatilities, for Y (horizontal axis) within two
standard deviations from the mean of its stationary distribution, with  = 1:16,
 = 0:95, b = 0:18,  = 0:044, a = 0:046, r = 0:028,  = 0:02, and  = 2.
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3.5.2 Stochastic Interest Rate
The second example is a model in which the price of risky assets, discounted by
the interest rate, are geometric Brownian Motions, but the interest rate follows a
Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process (c.f. Vasicek (1977)).
dS0t
S0t
=Ytdt; (3.5.22)
dSit
Sit
=Ytdt+ dR
i
t; 1  i  n; (3.5.23)
dRit =idt+
nX
j=1
ijdZ
j
t ; 1  i  n; (3.5.24)
dYt =b(   Yt)dt+ adWt; (3.5.25)
dhZi;W it =idt; 1  i  n: (3.5.26)
where  = (1;    ; n)0,  = (1;    ; n)0 2 Rn, r, , b, and A = a2 > 0 are all
constants. Z = (Z1;    ; Zn) and W are n- and 1-dimensional multivariate Brownian
Motions. Denote covariance matrices as  = a 2 Rn and  = 0 2 Rnn, which
is positive denite.
Assume 0 < 1 so that the market is incomplete. The agent has risk aversion
 > 1, and maximizes utility from consumption with innite horizon. Thus, m =
 + (1  )0 > 1.
The rst lemma guarantees solutions of the ODEs in Theorem 3.13 and 3.14 for
this model.
Lemma 3.21. For constants k and K 2 R, A > 0, b > 0 and d > 0 if
d2A
b2
 K   dk
b
< 0; (3.5.27)
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the equation
g 1 + (k   by) gy
g
+
Agyy
2g
  dy  K = 0 (3.5.28)
has a solution
g(y) =
Z 1
0
h(y; t)dt; (3.5.29)
where
h(y; t) = eC(t) B(t)y; (3.5.30)
B(t) =
d(1  e bt)
b
; (3.5.31)
C(t) =  1
4b3
 
d2Ae 2bt    4d2A  4dbk e bt + 3d2A  4dbk+ d2A
2b2
 K   dk
b

t:
(3.5.32)
Proposition 3.22. Under the condition
A(1  )2
22
  b2

(   1)0 1
22
+


  A(m  1)(   1)
2
22b2

  b(   1)


b +
(1  )0 1


< 0;
(3.5.33)
the model (3.5.22)-(3.5.26) satises the assumptions in Theorem 3.13 and 3.14. In
particular, let k = b+ (1 )
0 1

, d =  1

and B(t) = d(1 e
 bt)
b
, gD(y) =
R1
0
eC(t) B(t)ydt,
where
C(t) =  1
4b3
 
d2Ae 2bt    4d2A  4dbk e bt + 3d2A  4dbk+ d2A
2b2
 K   dk
b

t;
(3.5.34)
K =
(   1)0 1
22
+


; (3.5.35)
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and gP (y) =
R1
0
e
C(t) B(t)ydt, where
C(t) =  1
4b3
 
d2Ae 2bt    4d2A  4dbk e bt + 3d2A  4dbk+ d2A
2b2
  K   dk
b

t;
(3.5.36)
K =
(   1)0 1
22
+


  (m  1)d
2A
2b2
: (3.5.37)
Remark 3.23. Note that condition (3.5.33) is satised when  = 1, thus Proposition
3.22 holds at least for models in which the investor's relative risk aversion is close to
1.
Corollary 3.24. The approximate optimal consumption l(Yt) = g
P (Yt)
 1 is an in-
creasing function in Yt and .
Proof. gP (y) is decreasing in y, because y's coecient B(t) in the exponential function
is non-negative. Since  only appears in C(t), and has negative coecients, gP (y) is
decreasing in . Thus l(Yt) = g
P (Yt)
 1 is increasing in Yt and .
Let R be the real return in S&P composite and state variable Y be the real interest
rate, parameters for the model (3.5.22)-(3.5.26) with one risky asset, as summarized
in Table 3.2, are estimated using Shiller's data from 1871 to 2010 (see footnote 4), by
matching quadratic variations and moments of the state variable's stationary distri-
bution6.
Figure 3.7 shows the upper bound of the CEL of approximate strategies ^ =
 1

+  1g
P
y
gP
, and l^t = g
P (Yt)
 1 in Proposition 3.17 with  1    1,  = 2, Y
at the mean of its stationary distribution and other parameters in Table 3.2. The
graph conrms that in complete market case, i.e. when  = 1 or  1, the approximate
6In the model (3.5.22)-(3.5.26), Y is an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process. Thus, the stationary distri-
bution of Y is a Gaussian distribution, with mean  and variance a
2
2b .
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Parameter   b  a  
Value 0.053 0.19 0.68 0.028 0.076 -0.24 0.02
Table 3.2: Parameters for the model of stochastic interest rate, with the real interest
rate as the state variable. Except for , parameters are estimated using Shiller's
data from 1871 to 2010, by matching quadratic variations and moments of the state
variable's stationary distribution.
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Figure 3.7: The upper bound of the CEL (vertical axis, in percentage) of approximate
strategies in the model of stochastic interest rate against correlation coecient  1 
  1 (horizontal axis), with  = 0:053,  = 0:19, b = 0:68, Y =  = 0:028, a = 0:076,
 = 0:02 and  = 2.
strategies ^ = 
 1

+  1g
P
y
gP
, and l^t = g
P (Yt)
 1 have a CEL = 0, and thus are
optimal. The largest CEL appears around  = 0:2, which leads to a loss of less than
10% of the initial wealth for investors using the approximate strategies. Results with
 = 1:5, 2:5 (not reported here) show the same pattern, and the largest CEL is always
less than 18%.
Figure 3.8 shows the upper bound of the CEL of approximate strategies with
1    4, Y at the mean of its stationary distribution and other parameters in
Table 3.2. The graph conrms that in logarithmic utility case, i.e. when  = 1, the
approximate strategies have a CEL = 0, and thus are optimal. Relative risk aversion
 > 1 has two eects on the CEL, which explain why the CEL bound increases with
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Figure 3.8: The upper bound of the CEL (vertical axis, in percentage) of approximate
strategies in the model of stochastic interest rate against relative risk aversion 1 
  4 (horizontal axis), with  = 0:053,  = 0:19, b = 0:68, Y =  = 0:028, a = 0:076,
 = 0:02 and  =  0:24.
: 1) as  increases, m =  + (1   )2 is farther from 1, and the ODE which gP
solves in Theorem 3.14 deviates further from the HJB equation (3.4.1). Thus, the
error, or equivalently, the CEL of approximate strategies based on gP is larger; 2) as
the investor becomes more risk averse, more of wealth is invested in the safe asset.
Thus, the untraded risk in the stochastic interest rate has more impact on the welfare
when using approximate strategies, and thus, the CEL becomes larger.
Figure 3.9 shows the lower and upper bounds of the optimal consumption gP (Y ) 1 
f(Y )  gD(Y ) 1 for Y within two standard deviations from the mean of its stationary
distribution, with parameters in Table 3.2, and  = 1:5, 2, 2:5. The smallest error
appears when  = 1:5, of about 3 basis points and the largest error appears when
 = 2:5, of about 28 basis points. Figure 3.10 shows the upper bound of the relative
error g
D(Y ) 1 gP (Y ) 1
gP (Y ) 1 for dierent values of .  = 1:5 leads to the smallest relative
error, about 1% and  = 2:5 leads to the largest relative error, around 10%.
With  = 2 and other parameters in Table 3.2, Figure 3.11 show the approximate
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Figure 3.9: The lower and upper bounds of the optimal consumption (vertical axis,
in percentage) in the model of stochastic interest rate for Y (horizontal axis) within
two standard deviations from the mean of its stationary distribution, with  = 0:053,
 = 0:19, b = 0:68,  = 0:028, a = 0:076,  = 0:02, and  = 1:5 (solid line), 2 (dashed
line), 2:5 (dotted line), respectively.
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Figure 3.10: The upper bound of the relative error (vertical axis, in percentage) of the
approximate consumption in the model of stochastic interest rate for Y (horizontal
axis) within two standard deviations from the mean of its stationary distribution,
with  = 0:053,  = 0:19, b = 0:68,  = 0:028, a = 0:076,  = 0:02, and  = 1:5
(solid line), 2 (dashed line), 2:5 (dotted line), respectively.
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consumption gP (Y ) 1 and the Merton consumption assuming that the state variable
Y stays at the current level, for Y within two standard deviations from the mean of
its stationary distribution. In this model of stochastic interest rate, an increase in
Y indicates a higher interest rate, and also has two opposite eects on the investor's
consumption: income eect and substitution eects, as described in the discussions
of eects of improvements in investment opportunities above. The increasing ap-
proximate consumption with respect to state variable Y indicates that income eect
dominates. Comparing to the Merton consumption, the nearly optimal approximate
consumption (as shown in Figure 3.9 and 3.10, for  = 2, the absolute and relative er-
rors are less than 14 basis points and 4:5%, respectively) is larger when Y is small and
smaller when Y is large, which implies that the investor is more conservative regard-
ing changes in interest rate in this stochastic setting, because Y is mean-reverting.
The approximate consumption at Y 's long run mean is lower than the Merton con-
sumption corresponding to this average investment opportunities, which indicates a
precautionary saving eect. A comparison between Figure 3.3 and 3.9 shows that,
while both approximate consumption are nearly optimal and nearly constant com-
paring the the Merton consumption, the approximate consumption in the model of
stochastic interest rate is more sensitive to changes in the state variable Y than in
the model of stochastic expected returns and volatilities.
With the same parameter set, the Merton portfolio is a constant 
2
= 73:41%.
Figure 3.12 shows that the approximate portfolio t =
 1

+  1g
P
y
gP
decreases
slowly with the state variable Y , but is always riskier than when the investment
opportunities are constant. This extra investment in the risky investment is due to
the fact that interest rate and returns are negatively correlated ( =  0:24), the
investor holds more of the risky asset to hedge against changes in the interest rate. A
comparison between Figure 3.6 and 3.12 also shows that, the approximate portfolio in
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Figure 3.11: The approximate (solid line) and the Merton (dashed line) consumption
(vertical axis, in percentage) in the model of stochastic interest rate, for Y (horizontal
axis) within two standard deviations from the mean of its stationary distribution, with
 = 0:053,  = 0:19, b = 0:68,  = 0:028, a = 0:076,  = 0:02, and  = 2.
the model of stochastic interest rate is more sensitive to changes in the state variable
Y than in the model of stochastic expected returns and volatilities.
3.6 Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Lemma 3.7. Since for any dierentiable and strictly concave function f ,
and positive constant z,
sup
x
(f(x)  xz) = f

(f 0) 1 (z)

  (f 0) 1 (z)z; (3.6.1)
Let f(x) = e t x
1 
1  , then (f
0) 1(z) = e 
t
 z 
1
 . Replacing x by ct and z by yM

t , it
follows that, for any positive constant y,
e t
c1 t
1    e
 t

(yMt )
q
1     e
 t
 (yMt )
q + yMt ct; (3.6.2)
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Figure 3.12: The approximate portfolio (vertical axis, in percentage) in the model of
stochastic interest rate, for Y (horizontal axis) within two standard deviations from
the mean of its stationary distribution, with  = 0:053,  = 0:19, b = 0:68,  = 0:028,
a = 0:076,  = 0:02, and  = 2.
where q =  1

, and
E
Z T
0
e t
c1 t
1   dt

 y
q
1  E
Z T
0
e 


t (Mt )
q dt

  yqE
Z T
0
e 


t (Mt )
q dt

+ yE
Z T
0
Mt ctdt

: (3.6.3)
Plugging y = x
 
E
R T
0 e
  t(Mt )
q
dt
  ,
yqE
Z T
0
e 


t (Mt )
q dt

= yx; (3.6.4)
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and from(3.6.3),
E
Z T
0
e t
c1 t
1   dt

 x
1 
1  E
Z T
0
e 


t (Mt )
q dt

  yx+ yE
Z T
0
Mt ctdt

(3.6.5)
 x
1 
1  E
Z T
0
e 


t (Mt )
 1
 dt

; (3.6.6)
where the last inequality follows from the admissibility of c (see Remark 3.6).
Proof of Theorem 3.8. Since Xt = xe
R t
0
 
r+
0
s 
0
ss
2
 ls
!
ds+
0
sdZs
,
e t
c1 t
1   =
x1 
1   l
1 
t e
 (1 ) R t0 lsdse(1 )
R t
0

r+ 
 1+
0
s 
0
ss
2

ds+0sdZs

: (3.6.7)
Then, plugging in t =
 1

  1rf
f
and lt = f(Yt), it follows that the integral
in the exponential:
(1  )
Z t
0

r +

   1 + 
0
s 
0ss
2
  f

ds+ 0sdZs

=(1  )
Z t
0
0B@r + 
   1 +

  rf
f
0
 1

1CA ds
 
Z t
0
0B@

  rf
f
0
 1

  rf
f

22
+ f
1CA ds
+(1  )
Z t
0

  rf
f
0
 1

dZs (3.6.8)
= 
Z t
0
fds+ 
Z t
0
rf 0b
f
+
tr(AD2f)
2f
  rf
0Arf
2f 2

ds+
Z t
0
rf 0a
f
dWs
+
Z t
0
H(Ys)ds+ lnDt; (3.6.9)
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where
H(Yt) =f  
rf 0

b+ (1 )

0 1

f
+
rf 0 ((1 + )A+ (1  )0 1)rf
2f 2
 tr(AD
2f)
2f
  

+
(1  )0 1
22
+
(1  )r

; and (3.6.10)
Dt =E
Z 
0

1  

 1  (1  )
 1rf
f
0
dBs

t
E
Z 
0

(1  )

 1   A+ (1  )0 1 rf
f
0
(a0) 1dWs

t
:
(3.6.11)
From Lemma 3.25 below, Dt is a P -martingale with respect to Ft. Thus, it denes
a probability measure PD, identied by dP
D
dP
= DT . Since the innitesimal generator
for (R; Y ) under PD coincides with L^, then PD = P^ , by the uniqueness of the solution
to the martingale problem for L^.
Since f solves (3.3.4), H(Yt) = 0 for all 0  t  T . Also, note that, by Ito^'
formula,
Z t
0
rf 0b
f
+
tr(AD2f)
2f
  rf
0Arf
2f 2

ds+
Z t
0
rf 0a
f
dWs = ln f(Yt)  ln f(y):
(3.6.12)
Hence (3.6.7) equals to
x1 
1   (f(y))
  f(Yt)e 
R t
0 f(Ys)dsDt (3.6.13)
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Thus, with the candidate portfolio and consumption in (3.3.6),
E
Z T
0
e t
c1 t
1   dt

=
x1 
1   f(y)
 E
Z T
0
f(Yt)e
  R t0 f(Ys)dsDtdt

(3.6.14)
=
x1 
1   f(y)
 EP^
Z T
0
f(Yt)e
  R t0 f(Ys)dsdt

(3.6.15)
=
x1 
1   f(y)
 

1  EP^
h
e 
R T
0 f(Ys)ds
i
; (3.6.16)
where EP^ indicates the expectation under the myopic probability measure.
On the other hand, plugging the candidate  =  rf
f
, with q =  1

,
e 


t (Mt )
q =e
 

t R t0 q0 1  rf 00 1f dZs R t0 ( 1)rf 0af dWs
e
 q R t0 rds  q2 R t0( rff )0 1( rff )+ 2rf 0Arff2 +2( rff )0 1rff

ds
(3.6.17)
=e
R t
0

rf 0b
f
+
tr(AD2f)
2f
 rf 0Arf
2f2

ds+
R t
0
rf 0a
f
dWs 
R t
0 f(Ys)ds+
R t
0 HsdsDt (3.6.18)
=
f(Yt)
f(y)
e 
R t
0 f(Ys)dsDt: (3.6.19)
Thus,
x1 
1  E
Z T
0
e 


t (Mt )
 1
 dt

=
x1 
1  E
Z T
0
f(Yt)
f(y)
e 
R t
0 f(Ys)dsDtdt

(3.6.20)
=
x1 
1   f(y)
 

EP^
Z T
0
f(Yt)e
  R t0 f(Ys)dsdt

(3.6.21)
=
x1 
1   f(y)
 

1  EP^
h
e 
R T
0 f(Ys)ds
i
: (3.6.22)
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Lemma 3.25. If Assumption 3.1 holds, and
(i) there exists a unique solution P to the martingale problem for:
L =
1
2
n+kX
i;j=1
~Ai;j(x)
@2
@xi@xj
+
n+kX
i=1
~bi(x)
@
@xi
; (3.6.23)
where ~A =
0B@  
0 A
1CA and ~b =
0B@ 
b
1CA,
(ii) for f 2 C1(E;R), there exists a unique solution P^ to the martingale problem
for:
L^ =
1
2
2X
i;j=1
~Ai;j(x)
@2
@xi@xj
+
2X
i=1
b^i(x)
@
@xi
; (3.6.24)
where ~A =
0B@  
0 A
1CA, b^ =
0B@   rff
b+ (1 )
0 1

  (A+ (1  )0 1) rf
f
1CA,
respectively.
Then,
Dt =E
Z 
0

1  

 1  (1  )
 1rf
f
0
dBs

t
E
Z 
0

(1  )

 1   A+ (1  )0 1 rf
f
0
(a0) 1dWs

t
(3.6.25)
is a P -martingale with respect to Ft.
Proof. Since  and A are locally Holder continuous,  and a are bounded on compact
sets. Then from Corollary 5.4.9 and Proposition 5.4.11 in Karatzas and Shreve (1991),
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the uniqueness of the solution to the martingale problems for L and L^ is equivalent
to the uniqueness of the weak solution of the SDE with the innitesimal generator
L and L^, respectively, and thus the martingale problem is well-posed. Since rf
f
is
locally bounded, from Theorem 2.4 and Remark 2.5 in Cheridito, Filipovic and Yor
(2005), P and P^ are equivalent, and there exists a martingale D^t, with respect to Bt,
such that P^ jB = D^P jB for any P -stopping time (with respect to Bt)   T . Note
that D^t is also a martingale with respect to Ft, by by Theorem 2:8 in Revuz and Yor
(2001).
Thus, it suces to prove that Dt = D^t a.s. Since Dt is a local martingale with
respect to Bt, there exists a sequence of stopping times: 1 < 2 <    < n <    ,
such that P

lim
n"1
n =1

= 1, and Dt^i is a martingale for every i  1, with respect
to Bt and for the same reason as for D^t, they are also martingales with respect to Ft,
.
For any i  1, dene a probability measure P i by dP i
dP
= DT^i , by Girsanov
Theorem,
Bis = Bs  
Z s
0
00

(1  ) 1

  (1  )
 1rf
f

dt; and (3.6.26)
W is = Ws  
Z s
0
(a) 1

(1  ) 1

   (1  )0 1+ A rf
f

dt (3.6.27)
are Brownian Motions under P i for any s  T ^ i, and the innitesimal generator
for (R; Y ) is L^. Thus, by the uniqueness of the solution to the martingale problem,
P i = P^ jBT^i , and thus, DT^i = D^T^i. Since this is true for every i  1, and
P

lim
n"1
n =1

= 1, for almost every path ! and a xed T , there exists m  1 such
that m > T , and
DT (!) = DT^m(!) = D^T^m(!) = D^T (!): (3.6.28)
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Thus, the local martingale Dt coincides with the martingale D^t, and hence it is a
martingale with respect to Ft.
Proof of Corollary 3.10. By monotone convergence theorem, for any (; c) 2 A,
E
Z 1
0
e t
c1 t
1   dt

= lim
T!1
E
Z T
0
e t
c1 t
1   dt

(3.6.29)
Thus, from Theorem 3.8, with (; l; ) in (3.3.6),
E
Z 1
0
e t
c1 t
1   dt

=
x1 
1   f(y)
  lim
T!1

1  EP^
h
e 
R T
0 f(Ys)ds
i
 x
1 
1   f(y)
  lim
T!1

1  EP^
h
e 
R T
0 f(Ys)ds
i
=
x1 
1  E
Z 1
0
e 
t
 (Mt )
q dt

;
(3.6.30)
and the equality holds if and only if lim
T!1

1  EP^
h
e 
R T
0 f(Ys)ds
i
= 1.
Since 1   e 
R T
0 f(Ys)ds is non-negative and increasing in T , by the monotone con-
vergence theorem,
lim
T!1

1  EP^
h
e 
R T
0 f(Ys)ds
i
= 1  EP^
h
e 
R1
0 f(Ys)ds
i
(3.6.31)
Then, the inequality in (3.6.30) becomes an equality, or equivalently, (; l; ) in
(3.3.6) is optimal, when
EP^
h
e 
R1
0 f(Ys)ds
i
= 0; (3.6.32)
which, since e 
R1
0 f(Ys)ds  0 a.s., is equivalent to
Z 1
0
f(Ys)ds =1 a.s.; (3.6.33)
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and in this case, both sides of (3.6.30) are equal to x
1 
1  f(y)
 .
Proof of Proposition 3.11. Since Y is recurrent under P^ , L^ is critical by Theorem
4:3:3 in Pinsky (1991). Positive recurrence implies that, by denition,
Z
E
~c(y)dy <1; (3.6.34)
where ~c is the unique (up to a constant multiple) positive harmonic function for
L^ on E, and L^ is the formal adjoint to L^. Then, Theorem 4:8:6 in Pinsky (1991)
implies that,
(dy) =
~c(y)dyR
E
~c(y)dy
: (3.6.35)
Let fn(y) = max(f(y); n), from Theorem 4:9:5 in Pinsky (1991),
lim
T!1
1
T
Z T
0
fn(Yt)dt =
Z
E
fn(y)(dy): (3.6.36)
By monotone convergence theorem,
lim
n!1
Z
E
fn(y)(dy) =
Z
E
f(y)(dy): (3.6.37)
On the other hand,
lim
T!1
1
T
Z T
0
f(Yt)dt  lim
n!1
lim
T!1
1
T
Z T
0
fn(Yt)dt: (3.6.38)
Thus,
lim
T!1
1
T
Z T
0
f(Yt)dt  lim
n!1
Z
E
fn(y)(dy) =
Z
E
f(y)(dy): (3.6.39)
86
Since
R
E
f(y)(dy) > 0,
Z 1
0
f(Yt)dt =1 a.s., (3.6.40)
and the optimality follows from Corollary 3.10.
Proof of Theorem 3.13. Consider the stochastic discount factor
Mt = e
R t
0  rsdsE
Z 
0
  0 1    1dZs + Z 
0
adWs

t
; (3.6.41)
where  =
gDy
gD
. Then, following similar calculations as for the dual bound in Theorem
3.8,
 t

lnM qt =
Z t
0
0@ 

+
(1  )r

+
(1  )0 1
2
+
(1  )(1  0)A
2
 
gDy
gD
!21A ds
(3.6.42)
+
Z t
0
 
q
 
 0 1    1 g
D
y
gD
!
dZs + (   1)
agDy
gD
dWs
!
: (3.6.43)
Since by Ito^'s formula, d ln gD =

bgDy
gD
  A
2

gDy
gD
2
+
AgDyy
2gD

dt+
agPy
gP
dWt, the above
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equals to:
Z t
0
 
 

+
(1  )r

+
bgDy
gD
+
(1  )0 1
2
!
ds
+
Z t
0
0@AgDyy
2gD
+
((1  )   1  (1  )0)A
2
 
gDy
gD
!21A ds
+
Z t
0
 d ln g(Ys) +
Z t
0
 
q
 
 0 1    1 g
D
y
gD
!
dZs + 
agDy
gD
dWs
!
(3.6.44)
=
Z t
0
 d ln g(Ys) + lnDt +
Z t
0
0@ HgD(Ys) + (m  1)A
2
 
gDy
gD
!21A ds (3.6.45)
where
Hg(Yt) =

b+
(1  )0 1


gy
g
+
Agyy
2g
+
(1  )0 1
22
  

+
(1  )r

;
(3.6.46)
Dt =E
 Z 
0
 
(1  ) 1

+
(1  ) 1gDy
gD
!0
dBs
!
t
E
 Z 
0
 
(1  ) 1

+
mAgDy
gD
!
a 1dWs
!
t
: (3.6.47)
Thus,
E
Z T
0
e 
t
 M qt dt

= gD(y)E
"Z T
0
e
R t
0
(m 1)A
2

gDy
gD
2
ds
g(Yt)
 1e
R t
0
HgD(Ys)ds Dtdt
#
;
(3.6.48)
Since both the martingale problems for L and L have a unique solution, Dt is a
P -martingale by Lemma 3.25, and d
PD
dP
= DT . Thus, (3.6.48) equals to
gD(y)E PD
"Z T
0
e
R t
0
(m 1)A
2

gDy
gD
2
ds
gD(Yt)
 1e
R t
0
HsgD(Ys)dsdt
#
; (3.6.49)
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where E P indicates the expectation under PD.
Since gD solves the ODE gD(y) 1 + HgD(y) = 0, it follows that HgD(Yt) =
 gD(Yt) 1 for all 0  t  T . Since when  > 1(resp. < 1), m =  + (1   )0 >
1(resp. < 1), (3.6.49) is greater (resp. less) than or equal to
gD(y)E PD
h
gD(Ys)
 1e
R t
0  gD(Ys) 1ds
i
= gD(y)

1  E PD
h
e
R T
0  gD(Ys) 1dsdt
i
(3.6.50)
Therefore,
x1 
1  E
Z 1
0
e 

M qt dt

= lim
T!1
x1 
1  E
Z T
0
e 

M qt dt

(3.6.51)
 lim
T!1
x1 
1   g
D(y)

1  E PD
h
e
R T
0  gD(Ys) 1dsdt
i
(3.6.52)
=
x1 
1   g
D(y)

1  E PD
h
e
R1
0  gD(Ys) 1dsdt
i
: (3.6.53)
Since
R1
0
gD(Yt)
 1dt =1 a.s., the above equals to x1 
1  g
D(y).
Proof of Theorem 3.14. The primal bound is
E
Z T
0
e t
c1 t
1   dt

=
x1 
1  E
Z T
0
g 1e
R t
0(( +(1 )r (1 )ls+(1 )0s 
(1 )
2
0ss)ds+(1 )0sdZs)dt

:
(3.6.54)
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Plugging in lt = g
P (Yt)
 1 and t =
 1

+  1g
P
y
gP
, the integral
Z t
0

  + (1  )r   (1  )ls + (1  )0s 
(1  )
2
0ss

ds
+
Z t
0
(1  )0sdZs
=
Z t
0
 
  + (1  )r   (1  )gP (Ys) 1  
(1  )20 1gPy
gP
!
ds
+
Z t
0
0@(1  )(2   1)0 1
22
  (1  )
0A
2
 
gPy
gP
!21A ds
+(1  )
Z t
0
 
 1

+
 1gPy
gP
!0
dZs: (3.6.55)
Since by Ito^'s formula, d ln gP =

bgPy
gP
  A
2

gPy
gP
2
+
AgPyy
2gP

dt+
agPy
gP
dWt, the above
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equals to:
Z t
0
 
  + (1  )(2   1)
0 1
22
+
bgPy
gP
  (1  )
20 1gPy
gP
!
+
Z t
0
0@((   1)0  )A
2
 
gPy
gP
!2
+
AgPyy
2gP
1A ds
+
Z t
0
 d ln gP (Ys) +
Z t
0
(1  )
 
 1

+
0 1gPy
gP
!0
dZs +
Z t
0
agPy
gP
dWs
(3.6.56)
=
Z t
0
 d ln gP (Ys) + ln E
 Z 
0
(1  )
 
 1

+
0 1gPy
gP
!0
dZs +
Z 
0
agPy
gP
dWs
!
t
+
Z t
0
 
  + (1  )
0 1
2
+
bgPy
gP
+
(1  )0 1gPy
gP
!
+
Z t
0
0@((1  )0+ 2   )A
2
 
gPy
gP
!2
+
AgPyy
2gP
1A ds (3.6.57)
=
Z t
0
 d ln gP (Ys) + ln E
 Z 
0
(1  )
 
 1

+
0 1gPy
gP
!0
dZs +
Z 
0
agPy
gP
dWs
!
t
+
Z t
0
0@ HgP (Ys) + (m  1)A
2
 
gPy
gP
!21A ds: (3.6.58)
Plugging this equality back into the primal bound,
E
"Z T
0
e t
c1 t
1   dt
#
=
x1 
1   g
P (y)E
"Z T
0
e
R t
0
(m 1)A
2

gPy
gP
2
ds
gP (Ys)
 1e
R t
0
( 1)gP (Ys) 1+ HgP (Ys)ds Dtdt
#
(3.6.59)
=
x1 
1   g
P (y)E
24Z T
0
e
R t
0
(m 1)A
2
 
gPy
gP
2
 2F (Ys)
!
ds
g 1e
R t
0
( 1)g 1+( HgP (Ys)+(m 1)AF (Ys))ds Dtdt
35 :
(3.6.60)
Since the martingale problem for L and L both have a unique solution, from
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Lemma 3.25, D is a P-martingale, and d
P
P
= DT . Note that, and by assumption, g
P
is the solution of the ODE gP (y)+ HgP (y)+ (m  1)AF (y) = 0, therefore HgP (Yt)+
(m  1)AF (Yt) = gP (Yt) 1 for all 0  t  T . Thus,
E
Z T
0
e t
c1 t
1   dt

=
x1 
1   g
P (y)E PP
24Z T
0
e
R t
0
(m 1)A
2
 
gPy
gP
2
 2F (Ys)
!
ds
gP (Ys)
 1e
R t
0  gP (Ys) 1dsdt
35
(3.6.61)
Since

gPy
gP
2
  2F  0, when 0 <  < 1, m < 1 and (m 1)A
2

gPy
gP
2
  2F (Ys)

 0,
which implies that
x1 
1   g
P (y)E PP
24Z T
0
e
R t
0
(m 1)A
2
 
gPy
gP
2
 2F (Ys)
!
ds
gP (Ys)
 1e
R t
0  gP (Ys) 1dsdt
35
 x
1 
1   g
P (y)E PP
Z T
0
gP (Ys)
 1e
R t
0  gP (Ys) 1dsdt

(3.6.62)
=
x1 gP (y)
(1  )

1  E P
h
e
R T
0  gP (Ys) 1dsdt
i
: (3.6.63)
When  > 1, m > 1. Thus (m 1)A
2

gPy
gP
2
  2F (Ys)

 0, and the above
inequality still holds.
Finally, since
R1
0
gD(Yt)
 1dt =1 a.s.,
E
Z 1
0
e t
c1 t
1   dt

= lim
T!1
E
Z T
0
e t
c1 t
1   dt

(3.6.64)
 x
1 
1   g
P (y) lim
T!1

1  E P
h
e
R T
0  gP (Ys) 1dsdt
i
(3.6.65)
=
x1 
1   g
P (y)

1  E P
h
e
R1
0  gP (Ys) 1dsdt
i
=
x1 gP (y)
1   : (3.6.66)
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Proof of Proposition 3.17. By Theorem 3.8 and Theorem 3.13
V (x)  min
2R
x1 
1  E
Z 1
0
e 

 (Mt )
q dt

 x
1 
1   g
D(y): (3.6.67)
On the hand, since V (x) is homogeneous in x, by denition of CEL and Theorem
3.14,

1  CEL(^; l^)
1 
V (x) = V

x(1  CEL(^; l^))

(3.6.68)
=
Z 1
0
e t

l^tX
^;l^
t
1 
1   dt 
x1 
1   g
P (y): (3.6.69)
Thus, when  > 1,
1 

1  CEL(^; l^)
1 


gP (y)
gD(y)

; (3.6.70)
and when 0 <  < 1,
1 

1  CEL(^; l^)
1 


gP (y)
gD(y)

: (3.6.71)
Therefore,
0  CEL(^; l^)  1 

gP (y)
gD(y)
 
1 
: (3.6.72)
Proof of Lemma 3.18. For g(y) =
R1
0
h(y; t)dt, if
gy =
Z 1
0
hydt and gyy =
Z 1
0
hyydt; (3.6.73)
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in order to prove that g solves (3.5.6), it suces to prove that h(t; y) solves:
1 + ( ky + )
Z 1
0
hydt+
Ay
R1
0 hyydt
2
  (dy +K)
Z 1
0
hdt = 0: (3.6.74)
The above equation holds true if h(y; t) satises:
 @h
@t
+ ( ky + )hy + Ay
2
hyy   (dy +K)h = 0: (3.6.75)
with the boundary condition:
h(y;1)  h(y; 0) =  1; for all y 2 E: (3.6.76)
Because the above conditions imply that,
1 + ( ky + )
Z 1
0
hydt+
Ay
R1
0 hyydt
2
  (dy +K)
Z 1
0
hdt (3.6.77)
=
Z 1
0
@h
@t
dt = 1 + h(y;1)  h(y; 0) = 0: (3.6.78)
Taking derivatives of h(t; y) dened in (3.5.8)-(3.5.11) shows that it satises
(3.6.75). This h(t; y) also satises (3.6.76), because C(0) = B(0) = 0, C(1) =  1
and B(1) = 2d
k^+a^
, which implies h(y; 0) = 1 and h(y;1) = 0, for any y 2 E.
Finally, since B0(t) = 4d
2et
(et(k+) k+)2 > 0, 0 = B(0)  B(t)  B(1) = 2dk+ for all
t  0, (3.6.73) holds by Lemma 3.26 below.
Lemma 3.26. For the functions g(y) =
R1
0
h(y; t)dt and h(y; t) = eC(t) B(t)y, if
B(t)  0 and is bounded for all t  0, then gy =
R1
0
hydt and gyy =
R1
0
hyydt.
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Proof. By denition,
gy = lim
!0
Z 1
0
h(t; y + )  h(t; y)

dt = lim
!0
Z 1
0
eC(t) B(t)y B(t)   eC(t) B(t)y

dt
(3.6.79)
= lim
!0
Z 1
0
eC(t) B(t)y
 
e B(t)   1

dt: (3.6.80)
By convexity of the exponential function, when  > 0, e B(t)  1 B(t),
e B(t)   1
 = 1  e B(t)  1  (1 B(t)) = B(t); (3.6.81)
and, when  < 0, 1  e B(t) +B(t)e B(t),
e B(t)   1
 = 1  e B(t)  e B(t) + e B(t)B(t)  e B(t) = B(t)e B(t): (3.6.82)
Since B(t) is bounded,
 e B(t) 1  is bounded for  around 0.
Thus, from the dominated convergence theorem,
gy = lim
!0
Z 1
0
h(t; y + )  h(t; y)

dt =
Z 1
0
lim
!0
h(t; y + )  h(t; y)

dt =
Z 1
0
hydt:
(3.6.83)
gyy =
R1
0
hyydt follows from a similar argument.
Proof of Proposition 3.19. Assumption 3.1 and 3.12 are satised automatically.
For Assumption 3.3, Y is a CIR-process satisfying parameter restriction b  A
2
under P , hence it never explodes. Furthermore, since b(  y) and apy are Lipschitz
continuous on (;1), for any  > 0, there exist a unique weak solution of Y with
drift b(   y) and volatility apy on (;1). Then, since Y never reaches 0 under P ,
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there exists a unique solution on (0;1), and thus, from Corollary 5.4.9 in Karatzas
and Shreve (1991), the martingale problem for L has a unique solution.
For additional assumptions in Theorem 3.13, in the model (3.5.1)-(3.5.5), the ODE
gD(y) 1 + HgD(y) = 0 in Assumption (i) becomes:
gD(y) 1+

 by + b + (1  )
0 1y


gDy
gD
+
AygDyy
2gD
+
(1  )0 1y
22
 

+
(1  )r

= 0:
(3.6.84)
Since  > 1, 

+ ( 1)r

> 0 and ( 1)
0 1
22
> 0, from Lemma 3.18, gD(y) dened in
Proposition 3.19 is the solution of the above ODE, and Assumptions (i) is satised.
Then, since B(t)  0 and y  0, gD(y) < R1
0
eC(t)dt <
R1
0
e 
+( 1)r

tdt =
+( 1)r

 1
. Thus,
 
gD
 1
is bounded below by +( 1)r

> 0 and
R1
0
gD(Yt)
 1dt =
1 a.s., and also Assumption (iii) is satised.
For the martingale problem associated with L in Assumption (ii), the correspond-
ing SDE for Y is
dYt = (b   Yt) dt+ a
p
Ytd ~Wt; (3.6.85)
where  = b  (1 )0 1

 mAgDy
gD
. Since 0  B(t)  2d
k+
,
0  g
D
y
gD
=
R1
0
 B(t)h(y; t)dtR1
0
h(y; t)dt
   2d
k + 
: (3.6.86)
Thus, b   y and apy are Lipschitz continuous on (;1) for any  > 0. Therefore,
(3.6.85) has a unique weak solution on (;1) for any  > 0. Then, similarly as in the
argument for L, in order to prove the uniqueness of the solutions to the martingale
problem for L, it suces to show that Yt never explodes, which follows from Lemma
3.27 below. Thus, Assumption (ii) is satised.
For the additional assumptions in Theorem 3.14, rst, from Lemma 3.28 below,
there exists a constant Q, such that d = ( 1)
0 1
22
  (m 1)AQ > 0 and 2 d2
(k+)2
= Q.
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For F (y) = Q, the ODE gP (y) 1 + HgP (y) + (m   1)AF (y) = 0 in Assumption (i)
becomes:
gP (y) 1 +

 by + b + (1  )
0 1y


gPy
gP
+
AygPyy
2gP
  dy   

+
(1  )r

= 0: (3.6.87)
Then, since A > 0, +( 1)r

> 0 and d > 0, from Lemma 3.18, gP (y) dened in
Proposition 3.19 is the solution of the above ODE, and Assumption (i) is satised.
Furthermore, since similar as for B(t), 0  B(t)  2 d
k+
,
gPy
gP
=
R1
0
  B(t)e C(t)  B(t)yR1
0
e C(t)  B(t)y
   2
d
k + 
: (3.6.88)
Thus,

gPy
gP
2
 4 d2
(k+)2
= 2F , and Assumption (ii) is satised. Then, since
gP (y)  R1
0
e
C(t)dt  R1
0
e 
+( 1)r

tdt =

+( 1)r

 1
, gP (y) 1  +( 1)r

andR1
0
gP (Yt)
 1dt =1. Thus, Assumption (iv) is satised.
Finally, following a similar argument as for Assumption (ii) in Theorem 3.13, sincegDygD  is bounded, Lemma 3.27 below implies that Y never explodes, and Assumption
(iii) is satised.
Lemma 3.27. If b1  bt  b2 a.s. for all t  0,   a22 and stochastic process Y
satises
dYt = (   btYt) dt+ a
p
Ytd ~Wt; (3.6.89)
then Y never explodes to 0 or 1.
Proof. For non-explosion to 0, dene, for x > 0,
p(x) =
Z x
1
e 2
R y
1
 bu
Au
dudy: (3.6.90)
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For x < 1, p2(x)  p(x)  p1(x), where
p1(x) =
Z x
1
e 2
R y
1
 b1u
Au
dudy; (3.6.91)
p2(x) =
Z x
1
e 2
R y
1
 b2u
Au
dudy: (3.6.92)
Since   a2
2
, p2(0+) = 1. Thus p(0+) = 1, and from Proposition 5.5.22
in Karatzas and Shreve (1991), starting from y > 0, Yt never reaches 0. For non-
explosion to 1, consider n Ornstein-Uhlenbeck processes X it , i = 1;    ; n:
dX it =  
b1
2
X itdt+
a
2
dW it ; (3.6.93)
where W i, i = 1;    ; n, are n independent Brownian Motions. Let ~Yt =
nX
i=1
 
X it
2
,
then,
d ~Yt =

nA
4
  b1 ~Yt

dt+ a
q
~Yt
nX
i=1
X itp
~Yt
dW it : (3.6.94)
Note that Wt =
R t
0
Pn
i=1
Xisp
~Ys
dW is is a continuous local martingale starting from
0 and, since
Pn
i=1
(Xit)
2
~Yt
= 1, its quadratic variation is t. Thus, by Levy's Theorem,
W is a Brownian Motion. Then, let n be large enough such that nA
4
 , by the
comparison principle, ~Yt with dynamics:
d ~Yt =

nA
4
  b1 ~Yt

dt+ a
q
~YtdWt (3.6.95)
dominates Y 1t satisfying:
dY 1t =
 
   b1Y 1t

dt+ a
p
Y 1t dWt; (3.6.96)
which in turn dominates Yt. Since ~Yt is the sum of squares of n independent Ornstein-
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Uhlenbeck processes, which are Gaussian and thus, have nite moments of any order
at nite times, ~Yt never explodes to 1, and so does Yt.
Lemma 3.28. For the model (3.5.1)-(3.5.5), there exists a constant Q > 0, such that
(m  1)AQ < ( 1)0 1
22
, and
2 d2
(k + )2
= Q: (3.6.97)
where
d =
(   1)0 1
22
  (m  1)AQ; (3.6.98)
k = b  (1  )
0 1

; (3.6.99)
 =
p
k2 + 2 dA: (3.6.100)
Proof. Consider the function
U(Q) =
2 d2
(k + )2
 Q: (3.6.101)
For Q = 0, d = ( 1)
0 1
22
> 0 by (3.6.98), hence U = 2
d2
(k+)2
> 0; for Q =
( 1)0 1
2(m 1)A2 > 0,
d = 0 and U =  Q < 0. Since U and d are both continuous
functions of Q, there must exists a constant Q between 0 and ( 1)
0 1
2(m 1)A2 , such that
U(Q) = 0 and d > 0.
Proof of Lemma 3.21. For g(y) =
R1
0
h(y; t)dt, if
gy =
Z 1
0
hydt and gyy =
Z 1
0
hyydt; (3.6.102)
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in order to prove that g solves (3.5.28), it suces to prove that h(t; y) solves:
1 + (k   by)
Z 1
0
hydt+
A
R1
0 hyydt
2
  (dy +K)
Z 1
0
hdt = 0: (3.6.103)
The above equation holds true if h(y; t) satises:
 @h
@t
+ (k   by)hy + A
2
hyy   (dy +K)h = 0: (3.6.104)
with the boundary condition:
h(y;1)  h(y; 0) =  1; for all y 2 E: (3.6.105)
Because the above conditions imply that,
1 + (k   by)
Z 1
0
hydt+
A
R1
0 hyydt
2
  (dy +K)
Z 1
0
hdt (3.6.106)
=
Z 1
0
@h
@t
dt = 1 + h(y;1)  h(y; 0) = 0: (3.6.107)
Taking derivatives of h(t; y) dened in (3.5.30)-(3.5.32) shows that it satises
(3.6.104). This h(t; y) also satises (3.6.105), because C(0) = B(0) = 0, B(1) = d
b
,
and since d
2A
b2
 K  dk
b
< 0, C(1) =  1, which implies h(y; 0) = 1 and h(y;1) = 0,
for any y 2 E.
Finally, since 0  B(t)  d
b
for all t  0, (3.6.102) holds by Lemma 3.26.
Proof of Proposition 3.22. Assumption 3.1 and 3.12 are satised automatically.
For Assumption 3.3, Y is a Vasicek diusion under P , thus, it never explodes.
Furthermore, since    by and a are Lipschitz continuous on ( 1;1), there exist a
unique weak solution of Y with drift    by and volatility a on ( 1;1) and thus,
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by Corollary 5.4.9 in Karatzas and Shreve (1991), the martingale problem for L has
a unique solution.
For additional assumptions in Theorem 3.13, in the model (3.5.22) to (3.5.26), the
ODE gD(y) 1 + HgD(y) = 0 in Theorem 3.13 becomes:
gD(y) 1 +

b   by + (1  )
0 1


gDy
gD
+
AgDyy
2gD
+
(1  )0 1
22
  

+
(1  )y

= 0:
(3.6.108)
Since b > 0, A > 0 and ( 1)

> 0, together with condition (3.5.33), from Lemma 3.21,
gD dened in Proposition 3.22 is the solution of this ODE, hence Assumption (i) is
satised.
For the martingale problem for L in Assumption (ii), the corresponding SDE for
Y is
dYt = (k   bYt)dt+ ad Wt (3.6.109)
where k = b + (1 )
0 1

+mA
gDy
gD
. Since 0  B(t)   1
b
,
0 g
D
y
gD
=
R1
0
 B(t)eC(t) B(t)ydtR1
0
eC(t) B(t)ydt
     1
b
; (3.6.110)
0 g
D
yy
gD
=
R1
0
B2(t)eC(t) B(t)ydtR1
0
eC(t) B(t)ydt


   1
b
2
: (3.6.111)
Thus, k =  + (1 )
0 1

+mA
gDy
gD
is Lipschitz continuous, and there exists a unique
weak solution of the above SDE. Thus, according to Corollary 5.4.9 in Karatzas and
Shreve (1991), the martingale problem for L has a unique solution, and Assumption
(ii) holds. Also, since
gDy
gD
   1
b
,
k = b +
(1  )0 1

+mA
gDy
gD
 b + (1  )
0 1

  (   1)mA
b
: (3.6.112)
Thus, by the comparison principle, Y almost surely dominates Y^ under P , which
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follows
dY^t = (k^   bY^t)dt+ a Wt; (3.6.113)
where k^ = b + (1 )
0 1

  ( 1)mA
b
. Furthermore, since B(t)  0,
gD(Yt)
 1 =
1R1
0
eC(t) B(t)Ytdt
 1R1
0
eC(t) B(t)Y^tdt
= gD(Y^t)
 1: (3.6.114)
Then, since Y^ is a Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process, it has a stationary distribution
N

k^
b
; A
2b

, with density function (y) = 1p
A
b
e
  (y 
k^
b
)2
A
b , and
Z 1
 1
1R1
0
eC(t) B(t)ydt
(y)dy  1R1
 1
 R1
0
eC(t) B(t)ydt

(y)dy
(3.6.115)
=
1R1
0
R1
 1 e
C(t) B(t)y(y)dy

dt
=
1R1
0
eC(t) 
B(t)k^
b
+
B2(t)A
4b dt
; (3.6.116)
where the inequality follows from Jensen's inequality and the rst equality by Fubini's
theorem.
Since B(t) is bounded and, for t large enough, C(t) decreases linearly in t,
Z 1
0
eC(t) 
B(t)k^
b
+
B2(t)A
4b dt <1; (3.6.117)
and Z 1
 1
1R1
0
eC(t) B(t)ydt
(y)dy > 0: (3.6.118)
Thus, from Proposition 3.11,
Z 1
0
gD(Yt)
 1dt 
Z 1
0
gD(Y^t)
 1dt =1a.s.; (3.6.119)
and Assumption (iii) is satised.
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For the additional assumptions in Theorem 3.14, with F (y) = d
2
2b2
, the ODE
gP (y) 1 + HgP (y) + (m  1)AF (y) = 0 in Theorem 3.13 becomes:
gP (y) 1+

b   by + (1  )
0 1


gPy
gP
+
AgPyy
2gP
+
(1  )0 1
22
 

+
(m  1)Ad2
2b2
+
(1  )y

= 0:
(3.6.120)
Since d = ( 1)

> 0, A > 0 and b > 0, together with condition (3.5.33), from Lemma
3.21, gP dened in Proposition 3.22 is the solution of this ODE, and Assumption (i)
is satised.
For the martingale problem for L in Assumption (ii), the corresponding SDE for
Y is
dYt = (k   bYt)dt+ ad Wt (3.6.121)
where k = b + (1 )
0 1

+mA
gPy
gP
.
Since 0  B(t)  d
b
, following the same argument as for gD above;

gPy
gP
2
 2F =
d2
b2
, and Assumption (ii) holds. Also
gPyy
gP
is bounded, and the martingale problem for
L has a unique solution. Hence Assumption (iii) is satised.
Finally, since
gPy
gP
   1
b
,
k = b +
(1  )0 1

+mA
gDy
gD
 b + (1  )
0 1

  (   1)mA
b
: (3.6.122)
Thus, following the same argument as for gD above, by the comparison principle,
under P , Y also almost surely dominates a Y^ which follows an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck
diusion, and thus has a stationary distribution under which the expectation of gp is
positive. Hence Z 1
0
gP (Yt)
 1dt =1; (3.6.123)
and Assumption (iv) is satised.
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